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THE RHETORICS OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
CONSTRUCTING AUTHORITATIVENESS, THE "ELLEN
EFFECT," AND THE EXAMPLE OF SODOMY LAW
Kris Franklin*
"'Respect Ma Authoritah!'""
I. INTRODUCTION
When The New York Times lead story is a discussion of controversies
over whether legal citation in judicial opinions belongs in text or in
footnotes,2 something must be up. Mention legal citation to most lawyers,
judges, law professors and even the law review editors-to whom it can
seem like a life's work-and their eyes rapidly choose one of two strategies:
rolling upwards or glazing over. But if the subject is so tedious or irrelevant
to the intellectual work of law that even those most involved in the process
cannot maintain interest in it, why do Times editors assume the topic cannot
only captivate a general audience, but is of such significance that it deserves
attention before any other national or international news?
Perhaps the answer lies less in the issue of citation style, as the Times
article framed the question, 3 and more in what is at stake in the matter. Legal
citations construct legal authority. Legal authority, in turn, constructs law.
Thus, the question of what is cited in a judicial opinion, and where and how
it is cited, is not merely picayune or pedantic. Rather, it fundamentally
shapes what we understand to be American law. This Article seeks to model
a process of critically analyzing the rhetorical uses of authorities in judicial
decisionmaking, and to introduce a framework through which that model
might be expanded.
* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Sarah E. Chinn, without whom this article could not have been written, the
members of the N.Y.U. Lawyering faculty, whose comments on early versions of this work
tightened its analysis immeasurably, and Stephanie Toti and April Lambert for early research
assistance.
1. South Park: Chickenlover (Comedy Central television broadcast, May 27, 1998)
(paraphrasing COOL HAND LuKE (Warner Bros. 1967)).
2. William Glaberson, Legal Citations on Trial in Innovation v. Tradition, N.Y. TiMEs,
July 8, 2001, at AI.
3. Id.
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It should be noted at the outset that the term "authorities" is used rather
specifically in this article. I could, of course, just talk about "cases" or
"statutes," or, to be broader and consequently more generic, I could use
analogous terms like "sources." But the word "authority" has appropriate
connotations for the ways in which sources are used in legal argument. This
is not just a difference of vocabulary-legal writing expects sources to do a
certain kind of work that other disciplines do not necessarily require.
"Authority" itself means more than just a source: at its root it suggests not
just a point of origin, but a compelling cause. 4 Similarly, legal authorities
must be constructed as generating the arguments they support. Precedent is
binding not because it has already happened-in which case it would simply
be the past-but because (extending again the metaphor of genealogy) its
function is to reproduce itself in new decisions.
Despite the common high school civics lesson that the legislature
"makes" laws and courts "interpret" them, any first-year law student can
complicate that picture by pointing out that the common-law system means
that in large part American law is made by judges as much as by legislators.
First, statutes are inevitably interpreted by courts and take on new
meanings. 5 Second, many interpretations of legal doctrine are wholly
generated by courts as they perform their function of resolving legal
controversies. 6 Moreover, the line between interpretation and origination is,
both conceptually and actually, unpredictably porous. 7 The common law that
4. The Latin root word auctor has as an implicit meaning "progenitor" or "ancestor."
See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 117 (1989) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY] (indicating that the English word stems from the Latin terms auctoritas);
CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY 66 (1977).
5. There has been an enormous amount of debate on this point in legal scholarship. For
but one germane example, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958), and Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958).
6. See, e.g., EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949).
7. A familiar example of this ambiguity can be found in the privacy protections
established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The question of whether the privacy doctrine was judge-made
or was generated by Fourteenth Amendment constitutional protections has never been fully
settled, and served as an underpinning for the continued debates over the constitutionality of
abortion-related statutes throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Paul Win.
Bridenhagen, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, 82 CATH. U. L.
REV. 393 (1984); Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court;
The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989); Bruce Fein, Griswold v.
Connecticut: Wayward Decision-Making in the Supreme Court, 16 OHmo N.U. L. REv. 551
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emerges from judicial decisions often solidifies into what becomes accepted
legal doctrine,8 but can also move in new directions, 9 and can, wholly or in
part, introduce new concepts, 10 change older constructions11 or gradually
alter the way that law is understood. 12 This shifting border between genesis
and exegesis of law presents a challenge for the courts, since they must
always adopt the stance of being purely interpretive bodies.
The expectation of the division of powers among branches of
government has a sufficiently forceful rhetorical and practical charge-
(1989); William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold
v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1677.
For further discussion of indeterminate nature of judicial decisionmaking, see BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Learned Hand, How Far Is a Judge
Free in Rendering a Decision, in THE SPImIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND 108 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457 (1897).
8. There are, obviously, countless examples of this. The "separate but equal" concept
developed in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), is a good one, in that the Plessy Court
enunciated a particular way of understanding, explaining, and justifying the racial politics of
its time, attributed that understanding to constitutional principles, and created a legal
justification for a new state of segregationist laws that would not have been possible in the
absence of this decision. What was, at its time, a relatively new concept in jurisprudence-
separate but equal-became, over time, the terra firma upon which more than fifty years of
legal decisions and social policies could be built.
9. For example, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), modified
Plessy's separate but equal formulation by requiring the State of Missouri admit an African-
American to its state law school, since no separate facilities offered legal education for black
state residents.
10. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (19"), for example, the Supreme
Court developed a notion of strict scrutiny for governmental classifications based on race.
11. The most emblematic example of this is undoubtedly Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), wherein the Supreme Court concluded that separate educational
facilities were inherently unequal and consequently unconstitutional.
12. As in the changing meaning of appropriate remedies for historic segregation in the
shift from Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ordering integration of
segregated public school districts "with all deliberate speed" and directing trial courts to retain
jurisdiction during desegregation), to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (authorizing remedial efforts such as busing and realignment of school
attendance zones as corrective measures for previously segregated public schools), to Keyes v.
School District, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (permitting court-ordered district-wide anti-segregation
remedies even where there was evidence of intentional segregation in only part of the district),
to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (rejecting racially-
based admissions quotas in public universities, but permitting race to be a factor considered in
admissions).
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
accusations of courts "overstepping their bounds" or "activist judges" do hit
the judiciary hard-that most courts would rather avoid the appearance of
expanding the reach of the judicial branch. Thus, in order to maintain the
legitimacy of their interpretations, courts address the conundrum by
grounding their opinions in pre-existing doctrines. After all, law is an
inherently conservative discipline. It is cautious: it seeks to preserve that
which already exists, and it resists radical change. Successful interpretations
of law, perhaps especially those that seek to make the most radical changes
in existing law, usually attempt to bind themselves as tightly as possible to
that which already exists. These "accepted ideas" could take the form of
binding or analogizable statutes or regulations; common law doctrine'; or
proven-or at least demonstrable-facts.
Decisions about how authority can be used to support a particular
position are not made lightly. But they are not inevitable either: legal
arguments are constructed on a foundation of supporting authorities, and,
like any construction, they can fail if their foundation is not secure (or, at the
very least, not perceived to be secure). From the earliest days of law school,
attorneys are advised to "support every assertion of law or fact." 13 But this
maxim raises the tautological questions: what qualifies as an assertion that
requires support? And what constitutes support itself?
Within the world of legal authority, the commandment is to provide
material proof-that is, evidence that can and should be duplicable in
another piece of writing about the same topic (for example, previous judicial
decisions, or codified legislative enactments). As in written reports on
scientific experiments and data, a piece of legal writing implies that the
reader could go to the same authorities and come to the same conclusions-
that is, repeat the results of the experiment. Indeed the analogy between
scientific and legal proof can be extended even further to explain which
kinds of evidence seem most compelling and irrefutable. As a culture, we
accept "science" as true-as a matter of fact rather than of interpretation. 14
13. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 1.3, at 4 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE BLUEBOOK]; see also LINDA HOLDEMAN
EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PRocESs, ANALYSIS AND ORGANIZATION 93 (2d ed. 1999)
(explaining legal writers must cite to relevant authorities when they "make a point about the
law, the reasoning behind the law, or the facts of a particular case"); Richard Delgado, How to
Write a Law Review Article, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 445, 451 (1986) (similarly advising legal
scholars that "each assertion of law or fact... will require a footnote").
14. This hierarchy, however, is under scrutiny both within and outside the natural and
social sciences and the humanities. Questions of "truth" and "objectivity" have been under
serious (and furious) debate for decades. Given increased interest and publicity focusing on
genetics and neuroscience, however, U.S. culture has hardly abandoned its desire for and
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The social sciences are often considered to be on shakier ground. Human
interactions are too changeable and various to be pinned down in the way
that molecules and chemical reactions can be. While social sciences use
experimental processes, their results are thought of as more contingent and
subjective than those of the "hard" sciences. And, the theoretical work of the
humanities, which in many ways shapes public understanding of the world,
is treated with respect as academic inquiry, but is hardly imagined to
constitute demonstrable fact.
Similarly, legal decisions construct an implicit hierarchy of evidence. 15
On the top rung are statutes and binding common law, which are often
treated as physical facts (a human law imagined as a positive law of nature).
Explicit interpretation, or evidence garnered from social scientific sources is
viewed with skepticism and even distrust. Finally, observations about the
meaning of human interactions and social structures can only be introduced
as acceptable pieces of evidence if they are thoroughly grounded in
evidentiary forms that are higher on the legal totem pole.
However, legal facts and doctrines are not indisputable in the iconic and
seemingly incontrovertible way that physical, chemical, or biological facts
are, 16 for the very reason that law operates through principles of
interpretation, not scientific experimentation. 17 Moreover, this urging
towards "proof' operates quite differently in many other disciplines. For
example, the Modern Language Association's Handbook for Writers of
Research Papers,18 the definitive English-language guide to citation for
literature scholars, assures its readers that a variety of facts considered to be
in public domain need not be cited. 19 But in legal scholarship, these same
assertions require detailed and specific citation to an authority. 20
heroizing of "real" and "objective" information. New examples of the use of genetics and
neuroscience are reported daily. For one comprehensive example, see Michael D. Lemonick,
Smart Genes?, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 53 (describing scientific efforts to determine how
memory works, and to understand the genetic basis of recall and intelligence).
15. In some instances those differentiations are explicit, such as the distinction between
primary and secondary authority. Even within and between those categories, however, there
are unexplored divisions and assumptions about what constitutes "good" proof.
16. Even those "facts" are often both disputable and controvertible.
17. For a thorough discussion of judicial use of observed fact, see Peggy C. Davis,
'There is a Book Out . . .': An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100
HARv. L. REv. 1539 (1987).
18. JOSEPH GIBAmi, MLA HANDBOOK FOR WRITERS OF RESEARCH PAPERS (5th ed.
1999) [hereinafter MLA HANDBOOK].
19. The MLA HANDBOOK assures its readers that "you rarely need to find sources for
familiar proverbs ('You can't judge a book by its cover'), well-known quotations ('We shall
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This raises the larger question of the use of authorities in legal writing.
What is it that authorities are offering as "assertions of law and fact" that the
assertions themselves are incapable of doing on their own? Moreover, what
implicit information-what assurances-does legal scholarship expect
authorities to provide? The MLA Handbook is clear about the purpose of
citation in literary studies: scholars must show they have not stolen ideas
from their predecessors or colleagues by citing sources they do use. 21 By
implication, then, all other theories and arguments can be assumed to be
their own. In. this way the highest value is accorded to originality and
newness-truly new ideas can be identified by their lack of citation to other
scholars.
In legal writing in general, and judicial decisions in particular,
originality and newness are simply not at a premium. They defeat the
implicit argument of common law: that the judiciary builds upon and
interprets the past rather than devising original law. Therefore, the purpose
of citation is to prove a pedigree or genealogy, of which the new decision is
simply the offspring, looking like itself, but sharing the genetic material of
its progenitors. 22 Authorities are, in a way, guarantees of lack of originality,
of an ironclad link to the past, not a break from it.
Thus, the answer to the question "what qualifies as an assertion that
requires support?" could very well be "everything," since genealogy is by
definition a science of obsessive detail.23 But this is a dead end. If all
assertions must be supported, then footnotes require footnotes, which need
their own citations. In reality, then, writers have to choose. This means that
virtually every moment in legal writing can be characterized as replete with
decisions about what to support, and how to support it. Most legal writing
assumes a skeptical reader, and its purpose is to persuade the reader to see
overcome'), or common knowledge ('George Washington was the first president of the United
States')." Id. at 33.
20. For an example of recommendations given regarding extensive documentation in
legal scholarship, see ELzABFTH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK, SCHOLARLY WRITING FOR LAW
STUDENTS: SEMINAR PAPERS, LAW REviEw NOTEs AND LAW REviEw CoMPErrInON PAPERs 89-
99 (1995).
21. See GIBALDI, supra note 18, at 30.
22. See THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 13, at 4-5.
23. Hence the law journal articles in which footnotes outstrip text in length, to the point
of absurdity. For commentary on the potential silliness of citation in legal scholarship, see
Kenneth Lasson, Rummel v. Estelle: Mockingbirds Among the Brethren, 18 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 441 (1981); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REv. 926, 940 (1990); The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly
Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1474 (1975).
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things the writer's way. Since authorities are seen as confirming the
legitimacy of an approach, then any issue that is a possible point of
controversy, however minute, needs authority to bolster it. Thus, supporting
an assertion is a two-stage process. First, writers must identify those issues
that might raise questions in the minds of their readers. Then they must
locate authorities that most effectively address such questions. Ultimately,
the assertions most likely to be supported are the ones readers might
question.
The ways in which legal writers24 use and think about authority are
tremendously complex, even if they do not realize it (or perhaps especially
then). But legal writers are often under scrutinized. Developing support for a
proposition involves constant investigation, choice, and reflection. When
drafting an argument, a legal writer chooses, at the very least, which
propositions need support; where to look for authority; which of the
authorities found should be used; how to interpret the authorities to be used;
and how to refer to and cite the authorities in the context of the argument.
Consequently, an examination of how authorities are deployed in legal
writing-where they come from, how they are used, when they are not
used--can be enormously revealing of the assumptions behind any legal
argument or decision, beyond the explicit rhetoric of the piece itself.
The goal of this Article is to engage in a critical analysis of the use of
authority in legal writing, taking as a starting point the assumption laid out
so far: that authorities are crucial rhetorical elements of legal argumentation.
Under this rubric, analysis of authorities' usage must be contextual. That is,
a critical exploration of the use of authority cannot be merely mechanical,
but rather must be situated squarely within a simultaneous examination of
the tensions, logics and competing interpretations that might bear on the
question, and that might shape (or be shaped by) the authority that is
ultimately used. This entails a consideration of a great deal of legal, social,
and political thought on a given point, all of which contribute to a richer
understanding of the invisible choices being made within each citation.
24. By "legal writers" I mean all those who write in a legal context, most obviously (but
not exclusively) judges and advocates. This article primarily examines authorities in judicial
opinions. Since the projects of advocacy and decision-making are both predicated on
interpretation of law, many of the same inquiries about authority are relevant in both contexts.
But lawyers must ask courts to see things their way, while judges decide how things will be
seen. Necessarily, then, the divide in function, position and, power between advocates and
judges means there are significant differences in the ways each tend to characterize and use
authority.
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To begin, I offer as an example an analysis of the authorities used in one
case situated within an area of law fraught with conflict-the criminalization
of same-gender sexual contact. Why sodomy law? On the one hand, there is
no real answer to this question. After all, I am arguing that examining the
use of authorities in any decision will reveal an implicit but central rhetoric
that informs the text of the decision itself. To that extent, the selection of
cases to exemplify this thesis is essentially arbitrary. Nonetheless, sodomy is
an area of law that leaps out in any investigation of legal authority. Most
notably, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,25 in which
the majority's scant deployment of meaningful authority in the opinion has
been soundly criticized.26 Moreover, as both Hardwick and its commentary
demonstrate, sodomy decisions, which implicate a host of social and
political impulses regarding the control of sexuality in general and
homosexuality in particular, require courts to struggle with not only legal
principles, but also a panoply of cultural and historical forces.27
Thus, this Article first looks at the use (and nonuse) of some authorities
in judicial decisions on sodomy cases, specifically the Texas Court of
Appeals's recent decision in Lawrence v. State.28 In order to critically
examine how the majority and the dissent in Lawrence use authority, I take
several steps back from the contemporary case to examine the foundational
ideological split between conceptions of sodomy laws as regulating
proscribed conduct versus marginalizing a particular social status. I discuss
some of the central United States constitutional decisions that the Lawrence
court had at its disposal, the different meanings ascribed to the majority and
dissent's framing, the use or non-use of these opinions, by giving similar
consideration to less obviously crucial precedent, and to the introduction of
non-legal sources in the Lawrence opinion.
The second part of the Article uses the foregoing examination to
theorize about possible classifications of the authorities used, noting in
particular a distinction between those that appear to loom over an issue, and
those that somehow lurk around its borders. Since the rhetorical meaning of
authority is an immense topic that requires in-depth and sustained analysis,
25. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
26. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection,
54 U. Cm. L. REv. 648 (1987); see also Joseph Robert Thornton, Bowers v. Hardwick: An
Incomplete Constitutional Analysis, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1100 (1987).
27. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEx, POLITIcs, AND THE
ETHics OF QUEER LIFE 6-7 (1999).
28. 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001).
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this discussion is very much the beginning of an investigation into the ways
authority, and authoritativeness, can be understood.
II. READING AUTHORITIES IN SODOMY CASES
Sodomy decisions are fascinating because they broadcast not only legal
theorizing, but also a political stance. Sodomy has come to mean much more
than just a specific sexual act,29 and consequently decisions about the
constitutionality of sodomy laws that invoke prohibitions against
"homosexual conduct" are by definition speaking about more than the
misdemeanor. 30 For these reasons, it is possible for judicial decisions
regarding sodomy laws to diverge from the usual legal writing practices and
to depend more heavily on political conviction than legal authority.
Lawrence is a particularly compelling case because it avoids that trap. Both
the majority and the dissent work through their analyses by expertly
explaining their reasoning and precisely marshaling support for their
positions.3 1 Thus, Lawrence can provide insight into the variety of decisions
on sodomy, while acting as both illustrations of, and counterpoints to, the
tensions between legal authority and ideological position in these decisions.
In order to understand Lawrence, the complex forces that created the
cultural tensions and the political impulses the majority and dissent
represent must first be unpacked.
A. Culture Wars: Sodomy, Homosexuality, and Change
The so-called "culture wars" that emerged in the 1980s were sparked by
several different forces, but they exploded most often around the
representation of sexuality in art and popular culture. 32 While the concept of
29. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
30. Or, in some jurisdictions, a felony. See IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie 2000); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 34 (2000); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 158 (2001); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2000);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 886 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 2000); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 2001).
31. This may be due in part to both opinions' history as substantial revisions of their
initial formulation, prior to the Texas Court of Appeals rehearing of the case en banc. For
further discussion of the history of decisions rendered by the court of appeals, see infra note
67.
32. Allan Parachini & Dennis McDougal, Art in the Eighties; Censorship: A Decade of
Tighter Control of the Arts, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1989, at F1; see also Walter Goodman,
Battle on Pornography Spurred By New Tactics, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1984, at A8 (describing
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the "culture wars" may seem pass6 in the twenty-first century, the conflicts
this polarization embodied and were heir to had an irreversible effect on
contemporary cultural notions of sexuality and, accordingly, legal decisions
about sodomy.33 Moreover, the legal arena was not untouched by these
changes, particularly since many of the flashpoints of this conflict involved
both legislatures and courts, in efforts that ranged from attempts to pass
municipal ordinances to limit the sale of sexually explicit materials, to the
Supreme Court's decision regarding the "NEA Four."34
As struggles over sexuality and sexual representation came to the
forefront at the end of the twentieth century, homosexuality concomitantly
became more visible and more explicitly verbalized. 35 Faced with the
alliances and disputes in anti-porn regulation efforts); Richard Harrington, The Capitol Hill
Rock War: Emotions Run High as Musicians Confront Parents' Group at Hearing, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 1985, at BI (discussing movement to put warning labels on offensive record
albums); Jon Pareles, In Rap Music, the Beat and the Lawsuits Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1990, at C13 (describing obscenity trials over "2 Live Crew" performances and'albums);
Richard Stengel, Sex Busters: A Meese Commission and the Supreme Court Echo a New
Moral Militancy, TvI, July 21, 1986, at 12 (examining tensions in the morality movement of
the mid-1980s).
33. Legal scholar Francisco Valdes, for example, has recently reiterated the culture war
metaphor in analyzing sexual orientation law and lawmaking. See Francisco Valdes,
Afterword, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism,
Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as
Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1426-34 (1998). Additionally, Nancy J.
Knauer argues quite eloquently that contemporary legal struggles over homosexuality
constitute a cultural war in Homosexuality as Contagion: From The Well of Loneliness to the
Boy Scouts, 29 HoFSTRA L. REV. 401, 493-94 (2000). Moreover, even Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Scalia agrees with this characterization. In his dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996), Justice Scalia characterized the "Kulturkampf," or "culture struggle" as a
"politically powerful minority" of lesbian women and gay men and the "seemingly tolerant
Coloradans" who were attempting to strip homosexuals of their right to be free from
discrimination. Id. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding the
National Endowment for the Arts' decision to rescind merit-based grants awarded to four
artists whose work was deemed obscene).
35. In fact, the cause and effect here is hard to pin down. The visibility of activism
around AIDS and HIV challenged the silencing of gay men and lesbian women of the post-
gay liberation era. A strategy of AIDS activism was to bring sexuality into the forefront and to
talk explicitly about safer sex and sexual desire. See AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL
AcTivisM (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988); see also Brian Baehr, In Search of the Pleasure
Principle: Articulating Homosexual Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, in THE POWER OF
PLEASURE: PLEASURE AS A SOCIAL ANALYTIC (Laurie Essig & Sarah E. Chinn, eds.)
(forthcoming) (making a link between sexual openness generally and the visibility of
homosexuality).
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decimation of AIDS, and the homophobia accompanying the epidemic, gay
men and lesbian women pushed the boundaries of acceptability in art
galleries, on the street, in local legislatures, in religious institutions, and in
the courts.
Needless to say, these changes did not fully form out of the political and
cultural conditions of the 1980s, nor were they simply the inevitable
aftermath of the massive social and cultural shifts of the 1960s and 1970s.
They were the culmination of decades of change in sexual practices and
attitudes throughout the twentieth century. 36  Seemingly unrelated
technological advances, such as the invention and popularization of the
automobile, 37 the growth of a mass culture beyond the local popular cultures
of the pre-television era,38 the growth of cities and various sexual
subcultures within them, as well as developments more specific to sexuality,
such as the introduction of birth control pills, irrevocably altered the sexual
landscape of the United States. 39
While the connections between these cultural developments may seem
attenuated in a discussion of sodomy law decisions and the rhetorics of legal
authority, these phenomena intertwine narratives of social and legal change.
Ultimately, they reveal the osmotic relationships cultural critics have
observed between individual experience, historical analysis, and legal
structures.40 By unraveling these connections and tracing these narratives,
scholars can more clearly recognize the ways seemingly unrelated social
forces are in continual conversation with each other (and perhaps even
change the shape and tenor of those conversations).
36. For a thorough historical discussion of changes in sexual practices and attitudes in
the United States in the past century, see JOHN D'EMIuo & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1988).
37. BETH L. BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH TO BACK SEAT: COURTSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1988) (arguing that the0 popularization of automobiles in the 1920s
shifted courtship patterns and, consequently, sexual mores).
38. MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, AMERICAN CULTURE, AMERICAN TASTES: SOCIAL CHANGE
AND THE 20TH CENTURY 3-26 (1999).
39. D'EmlUO& FREEDMAN, supra note 36, at 239-74.
40. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). For further
examples of this scholarship, see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); SARAH E. CHINN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
RACISM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE BODY AS EVIDENCE (2000); PEGGY COOPER DAvis,
NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997); GERALD P. LOPEz,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992);
RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL: FRAGMENTS IN LESBIAN LEGAL THEORY
(1998).
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While these changes have hardly been positive, particularly given the
rise in social conservatism during the Reagan-Bush years,4 1 the last decade
has seen major increases in openness about homosexuality and in the
willingness (even eagerness) of the mainstream to imagine gay and lesbian
people as quite like themselves: what I term the "Ellen effect."42
Nonetheless, Ellen DeGeneres's public coming-out seems to have marked a
watershed in the way the straight mainstream media conceived of lesbians
and gay men as simultaneously culturally meaningful and not intimidating
(that is, "just like everyone else").
As historians of gay and lesbian communities in the United States have
shown, the phenomenon of gay "identity" developed in large part over the
twentieth century, particularly in the post-WWII period. 43 This sense of
41. For example, a recent report by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force concludes
that the lives of lesbians and gay men in the United States have significantly improved in the
1990s. See ALAN S. YANG, FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS: PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY AND LESBIAN
AMERICANS MOvES TOwARD EQUALITY (1999). What the writer neglects to acknowledge,
however, is that most of the statistics he cites, positive and negative attitudes towards gay
people are virtually the same as they were in the early 1970s, and the dramatic improvement
has been in comparison to the appalling national homophobia and AIDSphobia of the mid-
1980s. Id. at 21, 23-25
42. See Bruce Handy, Roll Over, Ward Cleaver: And Tell Ozzie Nelson the News, TIME,
April 14, 1997, at 78 (announcing Ellen Degeneres's decision to come out of the closet, and
the decision to have her television character do the same); see also Caryn Jones, Does the
Nation Care About "Ellen" Coming Out?, THE PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 16, 1997, at 4D
(analyzing the hype and fallout from the TIME cover story). Moreover, DeGeneres's public
pronouncement was part of a larger wave of celebrity acknowledgment of homosexuality:
Elton John, Melissa Etheridge, k.d. lang, George Michael (although not altogether willingly),
Rupert Everett, and more recently, Rosie O'Donnell, to name the most notable.
For an in-depth discussion of the effect of "closetedness" versus "openness" on the legal
analysis of sexual orientation, see Kenneth L. Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun: The
Rhetoric of Display and Camouflage in the Law of Sexual Orientation, 46 RUTGERS L. REv.
1313 (1994).
This nomenclature necessarily oversimplifies a complex and long-lasting process, and
may give credit to a celebrity that is more properly reserved for the millions of anonymous
lesbians, gays and bisexuals whose refusal to hide their sexuality brought about this cultural
shift.
43. See JOHN D'EMIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: Tan MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970 (1983); see also ALUAN BiRtJUB,
COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: TaE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN tN WORLD WAR Two
(1990); GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF
THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940, at 47-63 (1994) (discussing the emerging conception of
gay men, and differentiating that identity from "fairies"); ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY &
MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN
COMMUNITY (1993); Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and Lezzies: The
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identity represented a major shift from previous attitudes towards same-sex
sexuality, which was seen as a set of behaviors (defined as "sinful,"
"hateful," or "abnormal") rather than an element of a larger cultural entity,
"the homosexual." 44 Sodomy laws, which were initially enacted to punish
non-normative sexual acts between people of either sex, were defined as
sanctions against certain behaviors performed by certain kinds of people.45
At the same time, the opprobrium that was accorded to the acts carried over
onto the people identified with them (as well as accusations of gender
nonconformity)-gay and lesbian people may have constituted a population
in the twentieth century, but a scorned, and often violently suppressed one.46
Lesbian and gay political activism has made enormous strides in altering
the sense of gay people as a subterranean subculture, and creating instead a
notion of gay people as a recognized social group for whom civil rights
provisions could be made. The fact that so many states and municipalities
have enacted legislation to protect lesbian women and gay men from
Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
33 (1995). But see Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation
of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 197-98
(1996) (tracing the origination of "sexual orientation" to the thinking of the ancient Greeks).
44. MICIEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I 103-14 (Robert Hurley
trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1980) (1978).
45. This is particularly relevant to Lawrence. Texas's sodomy law had originally
covered various kinds of sexual acts performed by members of either sex. See supra Lawrence
v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109 & 14-99-00111, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760, at n.5 (Tex. App.
2000) [hereinafter Lawrence 1]. In 1974, Texas enacted a new penal code in which sodomy
between members of different sexes was decriminalized, and only the prohibition on anal and
oral sex between members of the same sex was retained. Id.; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06
(Version 1974). This change suggests that sodomy was no longer about sexual acts, but about
the meaning of sex between two people of the same gender, that is, about homosexuality
rather than "sodomy" per se.
46. For a thoughtful discussion of the effects of such homophobia on judicial treatment
of gay people, see Beth Barrett, Defining Queer: Lesbian and Gay Visibility in the
Courtroom, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 143 (2000). For discussion of recent studies showing
continued, and even rising, incidence of violence against those perceived to be gay, see Ray
Delgado, Anti-Gay Hate Crimes Growing More Violent; Fewer Incidents of Harassment in
S.F. and Nation, But More Killings and Beatings, S.F. EXAMINER, April 6, 2000, at A-7; Nat
Hentoff, The War Against Gays and Lesbians, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 24, 1998; Elaine
Herscher, Wyoming Death Echoes Rising Anti-Gay Attacks, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1998, at
A7; Martin Mbugua, Attacks on Gays Reported on Rise, DAILY NEWS (New York), April 13,
2001, at 6. See also Kirstin S. Dodge, "Bashing Back": Gay and Lesbian Street Patrols and
the Criminal Justice System, 11 LAw & INEQ. 295, 295-307 (1993) (exploring the causes and
results of violence against sexual minorities).
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discrimination demonstrates this quite concretely.47 What started off in the
1970s as a marginal proposition-that "the gay and lesbian community" is a
political entity (a segment of civil society, a voting bloc, a "demographic," a
definable group whose rights must be attended to, if not protected)--became
the cornerstone of the liberal gay rights movement and, over the course of
the 1980s and 1990s, part of the larger political environment.48 In effect, this
is how America went from gay liberation to "Ellen." 49 As a consequence of
these shifting cultural notions and the linguistic changes that have
accompanied them, the "Ellen effect" guarantees that the images of gay
people are never truly absent from conversation about homosexual sex.
Courts have hardly been untouched by the culture wars, as clearly seen
in decisions about sodomy. The court's decisions are indisputably shaped by
47. By July 12, 2001, twelve states, the District of Columbia, and dozens of cities had
banned sexual orientation discrimination. For an up-to-date listing of non-discrimination
ordinances, see NGLTF Maps & Charts, at http://www.ngltf.org/issues/maps. Of course, this
does not mean these ordinances have been uncontested: several anti-discrimination ordinances
were enacted only to be repealed later. See Tom Scherberger & Paul de la Garza, Gay Rights
Law is Repealed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at IA (discussing Tampa's repeal by
popular referendum of sexual orientation anti-discrimination legislation enacted a year
earlier); Richard Steele, A "No" to the Gays, NEWSWEEK, June 20, 1977, at 27 (describing
Miami's repeal of gay civil-rights legislation by a two to one popular vote). In recent years
there have been attempts, mostly by popular referenda, to prevent the enactment or
enforcement of nondiscrimination legislation benefiting lesbians and gays (most notoriously
in Colorado, but also in Oregon, Maine, Vermont, and elsewhere). See, e.g., Christopher
Heredia, Gay Rights Measures Get Mixed Reactions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2000, at A17. At
the same time, the rhetoric of these measures, while certainly homophobic, has not managed
to roll back the larger sense of gay people as a political entity-indeed, it may have intensified
this assumption.
48. Again, this is not universally accepted. Hence, the conservative right's resort to the
rhetoric of "special rights" in their support of the legal permissibility of discrimination against
lesbians and gay men.
49. This shift has not been without problems for queer people. The emergence of the
"Ellen effect" echoes various claims of the affluence of gay people (particularly gay men) by
pro-gay pollsters and homophobes alike. The public representations of lesbian women and gay
men as white, class-privileged, and socially and politically powerful, and the embrace of these
images by much of the leadership of the "gay lobby," have had quite deleterious effects on
progressive queer politics. The 1998 endorsement by the Human Rights Campaign of
conservative Republican Al D'Amato in his Senate race against Charles Schumer is perhaps
the most remarkable example of this. See Rick & William Douglas, Campaign 98: Gays
Endorse D'Amato-National Group Says Incumbency Gives Him the Edge, NEWSDAY, Oct.
21, 1998, at A7; L.A. Johnson, Differing Agendas Divide Activists, PITrSBURGH POST-
GAzErrE, Nov. 14, 1998, at B-I. Moreover, lesbian and gay rights organizations have been
slow to acknowledge, or enthusiastically fight for, more marginal elements of the queer
community or to link issues of social and racial justice to issues of sexual orientation.
[Vol. 33:49
2001] AUTHORITATIVENESS CONSTRUCTED BY RHETORIC 63
ideological stance. Since sodomy as a behavior has come to be coterminous
with homosexuality as an identity, rulings on sodomy cases necessarily
inhabit and exhibit a position on an ideological continuum. This
development has not been linear or monolithic, however, and despite the
immense cultural, political, and legal changes of the past half-century, these
meanings of sodomy are still contested.
B. Speaking Sodomy
The problem with prosecuting sodomy is that it is hard to know exactly
what "sodomy" means. The centuries-old undefinability and
unspeakability 50 of sodomy has resulted in an unfixed conception of
sodomy. 5 1 Consequently, the meanings of sodomy laws themselves have
shifted over the course of American law, in both colonial and post-
independence eras. Initially, prohibitions against sodomy in the English
colonies were borrowed from British law. 52 The earliest prosecutions of
sodomy embraced a range of nonprocreative behaviors: sex between
members of the same sex, nonreproductive sex between a woman and a man
(including married couples), or bestiality. These acts were defined as
"unnatural" because, as John Winthrop, one of the founders of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony argued, they "tended to the frustrating of the
ordinance of marriage and the hindering [of] the generation of mankind." '53
Since human nature was determined by divine will, to abrogate the dictates
of procreation was to challenge God: a sin as much as a crime. In fact,
50. Hence the common description of the crime as one which was fit only to be
described as the "infamous crime against nature . .. not fit to be named." 4 SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 242 (William D. Lewis ed., Reas
Welch & Co. 1897) (1769) (describing the offense as "peccatum illud horribile, inter
christianos non nominandum," that is, as "that horrible sin not to be named among
Christians"), excerpted in WE ARE EVERYWHERE: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK OF GAY AND
LESBIAN POLITICS 13-14 (Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997) (translation supplied by
the editors).
51. This is not to say that cultural definitions of sodomy have necessarily been vague.
While sodomy may have been unspeakable, it has hardly been unrecognizable, echoing Justice
Stewart's dictum on obscenity, "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. See generally Aimee D. Dayhoff, Sodomy Laws: The Government's Vehicle to
Impose the Majority's Social Values, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1863, 1865-67 (2001);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of
Same Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1012-16 (1997).
53. Robert F. Oaks, Defining Sodomy in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 6 J.
HoMosExuALITY 79 (1980-81).
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sodomy was a crime because it was a sin, and those who committed it were
sinners, punishable by anything from flogging and banishment to death.54
Given the expandability of the term "sodomy" (unlike "bestiality" or
"buggery," which were more clearly defined), and the cultural consensus of
what constituted acceptable sexual behavior (procreative, within the bounds
of marriage), for sodomy as a category, although condemned and often
harshly punished, "the details of its horror," as Jeffrey Weeks observed,
"remained decently vague." 55 The unspeakability of the specifics of sodomy
meant that communities had a great deal of leeway in deciding which acts
should be punished and how, and which, in turn, implicitly discouraged a
more limited or clearly demarcated definition of what sodomy entailed.
These attitudes towards the prosecution of sodomy endured in some
form through the mid-nineteenth century. Although the enforcement of non-
procreative sexuality dwindled over the course of the eighteenth century,
largely due to the waning influence of Puritanism in the North and the
economic expansions in the South, 56 the meaning of sodomy as the "crime
against nature" remained stable. Sexual culture in the United States changed
considerably in the nineteenth century, however. Birth rates among white
couples where both parents were born in the United States declined steeply,
mainly because married couples consciously decided to limit conception. 57
Contraceptives and abortifacients were advertised in women's magazines,
although in code, and women shared information about family limitation
methods through letters and conversations. 58 Self-help guides and
sexological studies also began to appear, codifying and medicalizing sexual
behavior.
This medicalization of marital sexuality also affected definitions of
sodomy. As historians John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman observed,
sodomy was decreasingly imagined as sinful and increasingly imagined as
diseased, "a manifestation of a bodily or mental condition." 59 Rather than
sin, sodomy was a "perversion"-a reversal of the natural biological (rather
54. D'EMnuo & FREEDMAN, supra note 36, at 31 ("Like other sinners, women or men
who were punished for unnatural sexual acts did not acquire a lifetime identity as
'homosexuals' and they could be reintegrated into the fold.").
55. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS, MYTHS & MODERN
SExUALrriES 90 (1989).
56. D'EMIUO & FREEDMAN, supra note 36, at 38.
57. Id. at 58.
58. JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA
190-94, 200 (1994).
59. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 36, at 122; see also Knaver, supra note 33, at 410-
23.
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than divine) order.60 Part and parcel of the triumph of scientism over
religion in understandings of sexuality was the emerging conception that
specific sexual behaviors lined up with recognizable types of people: a
notion that flourished in the early twentieth century with the invention of the
category of "the invert, ' 6 1 and later "the homosexual." '62
In some ways, the meaning of sodomy remained the same. It was defined
as those acts that were irredeemably deviant and dangerous to the social
order. With such radical alterations in the social meanings of sexuality,
however, the opprobrium of sodomy moved away from the possibility of
anyone engaging in nonreproductive sexuality. What began to be proscribed
as "sodomy" narrowed and as a result divided. On the one hand, sodomy as
nonprocreative heterosexual sex became more acceptable and hence more
speakable, the array of acts that remained outside the pale shrank to the
category of the truly ineffable. On the other hand, with the development and
description of categories of sexual personae, sodomy was ascribed as a set of
behaviors increasingly identified with "inverts," whose sexual identities
were legible through a variety of extrasexual signs.63 Thus, conceptions of
sodomy became bifurcated along two separate lines of concern: act-specific
prohibitions (generally oral and anal sex) and gender-specific prohibitions
(sexual contact between people of the same gender).
Cultural notions of sodomy rarely took into account this split and the
tension it created, in large part because the overlap between them (men
engaging in certain prohibited behaviors) was at the heart of informal
definitions of sodomy.64 As these informal definitions became codified into
law and other formal structures of understanding (such as dictionaries or
medical textbooks) the division over what sodomy meant continued over,
creating new laws and more specific meanings. At the same time, the
inability to recognize the multiplicities inherent in what "sodomy" now
meant was exacerbated by the assumption, both formally and informally,
60. D'EMIIo & FREEDMAN, supra note 36, at 122.
61. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 52, at 1011.
62. Id. at 1053-54.
63. See generally id. at 1014-16, 1022-31.
64. Although sodomy prohibitions can govern sexual contact between women or
between men, most prohibitions of sodomy have focused primarily on male-only behavior.
Sex between women has been punished both informally and by law, but more often as a
contravention of appropriate feminine behavior than as an explicit sex crime. Indeed,
lesbianism has more often been rendered invisible, most famously in Queen Victoria's
legendary refusal to criminalize lesbianism because she refused to believe women would do
such things. See Clarice B. Rabinowitz, Proposals for Progress: Sodomy Laws and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 425, 430 n.25 (1995).
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that whatever the definition, institutions and individuals knew unerringly
what this thing called sodomy was.
From these nineteenth century roots, the same problems around what
sodomy is and means still exist, as well as varying levels of acknowledgment
that there is a problem at all. This is apparent in how the majority
conceptualizes the legal issue in the initial, now supplanted, opinion of the
Texas Court of Appeals in Lawrence. In this case, John Lawrence and Tyron
Gamer were convicted after pleading no contest to the charge of violating
section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code, which prohibits "homosexual
conduct. ' 65 Lawrence and Garner were arrested after having been
discovered by police in a private home, engaging in consensual sexual
relations with each other. The first opinion of the Texas Court of Appeals
("Lawrence "), rendered by a three-judge panel, was issued on June 8,
2000, and found for Lawrence and Gamer. 66 This initial opinion was
subsequently retracted by the full court of appeals, which on March 15, 2001
issued an en banc decision finding for the State. 67
In Lawrence I, the contemporary confusion over the meaning of the
word "sodomy" allows the majority's conclusion that section 21.06 violated
the Texas Equal Rights Amendment 68 to seem obvious and inevitable. In
65. Specifically, TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994) states, "(a) A person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the
same sex ...." Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as "(A) any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of
the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id.
Tensions about the desirability and constitutionality of the statute may be seen in the
fact that section 21.06 had twice previously been overturned on other grounds by Texas
courts, but that subsequent interpretations of the Texas Constitution resurrected the provision.
See City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1993); State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994) (finding
that section 21.06 violated the right to privacy under the Texas constitution). But see Henry v.
City of Sherman, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996) (denying that privacy protections prohibited
the enforcement of section 21.06).
66. Lawrence 1, Nos. 14-99-00109 & 14-99-00111, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760 (Tex.
App. 2000), withdrawn and substituted with Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.
2001) (en banc).
67. As a consequence, the first decision no longer has the power of law or precedential
value. Indeed, technically it no longer exists. Although this Article focuses in most detail on
the final decision by the whole court, the initial opinion is fascinating in its own right.
Moreover, some of the tone and much of the content of the ultimate decision, and the dissent
to it, are clearly formulated in response to the opinion initially rendered, and may, in part,
account for the fact that, this is one of the few recent sodomy law decisions in which both
positions seem thoughtfully constructed and argued.
68. TEx CONST. art. I, § 3a.
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order to address the constitutionality of the Texas prohibition against
"homosexual conduct," the majority found itself needing to examine
precisely what was prohibited, which is "deviate sexual intercourse"
between members of the same sex. Thus, immediately on the heels of
quoting from section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code, the court turns to
section 21.01:
"Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as: (A) any contact between any part
of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B)
the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.69
From there what the majority does is very interesting. The footnote the
opinion appends to this definition, note 2, observes:
In this opinion, we refer to "deviate sexual intercourse" as sodomy.
"Sodomy," while variously defined in state criminal statutes, is generally oral
or anal copulation between humans. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1391
(6th ed. 1990).
What is most striking here is the equation of the legal category of
"deviate sexual intercourse" with the more common term "sodomy." By
defining "deviate sexual intercourse" as sodomy, and then citing a non-
gender specific definition for sodomy (making sodomy act-specific), the
majority insists that singling out "homosexual conduct" creates a gendered
meaning for a term that is outside gender. Therefore, the Texas Penal Code,
by prohibiting same-sex "sodomy" and allowing different-sex "sodomy,"
clearly violates the state's Equal Rights Amendment, since it "proscribes
otherwise lawful behavior solely on the basis of the sex of the
participants." '70
What the majority does not acknowledge is that nowhere in this Texas
statutory scheme does the word "sodomy" appear. Indeed, the statute is
scrupulous in its avoidance of the term.7 1 This raises the question of why the
opinion introjected the notion of "sodomy" into its analysis. Perhaps the
Court wanted to acknowledge what the Texas legislature clearly desired to
avoid: the fact that Section 21.06 is in fact a sodomy law. In contemporary
United States culture, the word "sodomy" suggests same-sex (particularly
male) sexual behavior in a way that the much more neutral "deviate sexual
69. Lawrence 1, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760, at *5.
70. Id. at *6.
71. This was, perhaps, a deliberate strategy of the drafters.
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intercourse" does not. By raising the specter of sodomy, the majority
implicitly engages in current debates around homosexuality and the law.
More important, though, is the majority's choice of definitions of
sodomy. On the one hand, Black's Law Dictionary is an acceptable authority
as the dictionary of record regarding legal terminology. It may, in fact, be
the best source. Black's Law Dictionary, however, is hardly a barometer of
cultural meanings-indeed it is questionable as such. This is borne out by
the fact that neither of the two definitive nonlegal dictionaries, the Oxford
English Dictionary and the Webster's Dictionary, agrees with Black's in its
primary definition of sodomy. For the Oxford English Dictionary, sodomy is
"an unnatural form of sexual intercourse, [especially] that of one male with
another"72; for Webster's, it is "copulation with a member of the same sex
or with an animal."'73 While Webster's does gives a secondary definition
"noncoital and [especially] anal or oral copulation with a member of the
opposite sex," this is clearly a supplement to the central meaning of the
word, and a vestige of the older definition rooted in pre-modem prohibitions
against nonprocreative sex.
Thus, the majority's choice of Black's takes on a larger significance. By
invoking sodomy and then defining it as act-specific rather than gender-
specific, the court answers its own question about the constitutionality of the
statute through its own process of definition. The majority's use of authority
presupposes its conclusion: after all, it would have had a much harder time
coming to the same decision had it relied upon the Oxford English
Dictionary, because with that gender-specific understanding of the term the
court's neat reasoning would have been tautological, rather than
determinative. Through this rhetorical slight of hand, the majority defines
out of relevance the competing (and, as the dictionaries indicate, and cultural
experience bears out, dominant) meaning of sodomy as sexual relations
between members of the same sex, particularly men.
This is confounding to the Lawrence I dissent, whose conception of the
unlawful behaviors outlined in section 21.06 is that they are wholly in line
with the history of prohibition of same-sex sexuality. The dissent is
mystified by the majority's assertion that the Texas Equal Rights
Amendment has anything to say about "homosexual conduct," let alone
provides protection for it.74 The dissent's discussion invokes the "historical
72. 2 OxjRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2904 (compact ed. 1971).
73. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1121.
74. In fact, the dissenting opinion opens with this observation: "[b]ecause I do not
believe the people of this state intended to decriminalize homosexual conduct when they
approved the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, I respectfully dissent." Lawrence 1, 2000 Tex.
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abhorrence of homosexual conduct," tracing a centuries-long trajectory of
condemnation of "the infamous crime against nature." 75 In other words, the
dissent employs precisely the meaning of sodomy that the majority
studiously avoids: sexual contact between men that must be condemned.
These two opinions are not just disagreeing with each other; they are-
speaking at cross purposes. Neither acknowledges the central assumptions
behind the other's argument. In fact, they cannot, since they are arguing for
mutually exclusive definitions of the role and meaning of same-sex sexuality
in contemporary American culture. The increasing "speakability" of sodomy
has not led to sodomy being spoken in a single voice. What started off in the
nineteenth century as diverging but overlapping definitions of sodomy have,
at the beginning of the twenty-first, become almost antithetical
understandings of what it is that sodomy statutes are designed to prevent and
prohibit. This calcification of these distinctions has intensified because of
the cultural changes around sexuality and homosexuality, so that an act-
specific definition of sodomy self-consciously denies the relevance to the
law of a culturally extant homosexual identity. 76
All this begs a central question: what is the purpose of sodomy laws? Do
they regulate certain behaviors, or regulate and control certain kinds of
people? Very often, as seen in Lawrence I, this question is never explicitly
asked or answered, but the implicit answer serves as the backdrop for the
consequent decision. And the current enforcement of sodomy laws may or
may not be consonant with the motivations behind a given statute's initial
creation. 77
More importantly, the act-specific/gender-specific divide in
interpretations of sodomy laws maps almost directly onto a larger
ideological split between sexual conduct and sexual status. The Texas
statute straddles this split. On the one hand it prohibits "homosexual
conduct." On the other, the invocation of the word "homosexual," as
opposed to, for example, "same sex," raises the image of the homosexual
App. LEXIS 3760, at *16 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 25-31.
76. Knaver, supra note 33, at 464-65.
77. Lawrence 1, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760. This is not the case with the Texas law,
which was drafted in the early 1970s. The new law was part of a push for "liberalization" of
sex-related codes, and erased the criminalization of consensual sexual activities between
members of different sexes, retaining only same-sex prohibitions in relation to sodomy. Id. at
*6. So the exclusive prosecution of same-sex couples is exactly in line with the law as written.
The Georgia sodomy law, however, regulates certain acts performed by people of either sex in
any combination, but was (until overturned in Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1995)), as
discussed below, interpreted as enforceable exclusively against same-sex participants.
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people who would engage in such conduct. This leaves plenty of space for
the majority in Lawrence I to interpret section 21.06 as affecting people; at
the same time it also allows the dissent to focus on conduct.
This is not a new conundrum. Its most forceful articulation is in Bowers
v. Hardwick.78 As many commentators have observed, the majority and the
vigorous dissent in Hardwick neatly re-enact the status/conduct
differentiation. 79 Since the Georgia statute at issue in Harwick was act-
specific and gender neutral, upholding the letter of the law might have had
serious consequences for the constitutional protections afforded marital
privacy. 80 The Court defined itself as never having to deal with that issue,
since it supported the decision of a lower court to exclude the married,
heterosexual co-appellants who joined Michael Hardwick in his challenge to
Georgia's sodomy law. 81 The Court reasoned that Mary and John Doe, who
claimed the statute prohibiting consensual sodomy had an unconstitutional
chilling effect on their sexual lives, were in no "immediate danger of
sustaining any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute," 82 even
though the language of the law prohibited "any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth and anus of another."83
The Supreme Court's finding that "there is no constitutional right to
privacy for homosexual sodomy," 84 allows the Court to conflate conduct
with status. 85 The Court's logic begins with the implication that
78. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
79. See, e.g., Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle
Transformation in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 893 (arguing that
all gay rights arguments fall into one of two types, which essentially break down into the more
anti-gay Track 1, based on behavior, and the more pro-gay Track 2, based on gays as a
recognizable class); see also Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1752-67 (1993).
80. Particularly, in 1986, such a decision would have had an enormous effect on the
fraught body of law around abortion, which was originally grounded in the principle of
marital privacy first established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
81. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (11 th Cir. 1985).
82. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986).
83. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
84. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
85. This interpretation of the Court's equation that sodomy equals homosexuality, and,
by the transitive property of equality, homosexuality equals sodomy, has been discussed at
length in the scholarly literature surrounding the Hardwick decision, to the point that it has
become commonplace, and rises almost to the level of generally accepted, even if not entirely
uncontroversial, wisdom. For further development of the status/conduct conflation by the
Hardwick Court, see Halley, supra note 79, and the responsive papers, Anna B. Goldstein,
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"homosexual sodomy" is purely a behavior that could be engaged in by
anyone. However, this unspoken focus is undone by the Court's later
assertion that "[i]t is obvious to us that [no aspect of the Constitution] would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy." 86 As noted in previous articles, "the Court is playing both sides-
the legal discourse of 'sodomy' and the political discourse of lesbians and
gay men'-off against the middle by using an amorphous language of
'homosexuals.' In this way, the Court can maintain that its subject is
conduct, while the very fact that it essentially equates conduct with status
... is a conceptual dishonesty as well as a legal fallacy." 87
The status/conduct division, and the confusion between the two, endures
in legal decisions, in large part due to the pattern set by the Court in
Hardwick. The major difference, though, between the late twentieth century
and the early twenty-first is the "Ellen effect;" that is, the mainstream
cultural recognition of identity based around sexuality. As a result, it has
become significantly harder to elide the category of "lesbian and gay" into
the slippery language of "homosexual conduct." In recent years, then, the
untroubled differentiation between status and conduct has been increasingly
hard to find, as courts have had to operate within the shadow of the public
existence of a lesbian and gay body politic. Lawrence and Garner exemplify
this: on the surface it seems as though the status/conduct issue barely
appears and that the court is simply analyzing from different perspectives the
merits of an equal protection argument. However, upon a closer examination
of the building blocks of the majority's and the dissent's reasonings-the
authorities and absence of authorities on which their arguments rest-the
status/conduct debate reappears.
C. Authorities in Lawrence
The majority and the dissent in Lawrence base their opinions on
opposite sets of assumptions. As the majority and the dissent in Lawrence I,
the two sides are speaking past each other. One side is reasoning from the
belief that condemnation of, and hence discrimination against, a certain
Reasoning About Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's "Reasoning About
Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick," 79 VA. L. REV. 1781 (1993);
Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79
VA. L. REv. 1805 (1993).
86. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
87. Sarah Chinn & Kris Franklin, "I Am What I Am" (Or Am I?): The Making and
Unmaking of Lesbian and Gay Identity in High Tech Gays, DISCOURSE 11, 17-18 (1992).
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group of people or set of behaviors is historically rooted and culturally
defensible. The other side assumes that sodomy prohibition has a disparate
impact on people on the basis of sexual orientation, a practice that runs
counter to the Texas Constitution.
These opposite positions are embodied in the differing Supreme Court
authorities that each side takes as foundational to its stance. The majority's
federal touchstone is Bowers v. Hardwick, which it places at the center of its
analysis. In many ways, this choice is obvious. Hardwick, in which the
Supreme Court directly addressed the constitutionality of the Georgia
sodomy law and determined that the statute did not infringe on any
fundamental right,88 directly addresses the constitutional protections of
same-sex sodomy in a case very similar to Lawrence.
The dissent comes at the case from a different angle, focusing its
attention on federal precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Romer v. Evans.89 While Romer does not deal with sodomy, it is on point
for a different reason. In striking down Colorado's "Amendment 2"
prohibiting any state and municipal anti-discrimination laws based on sexual
orientation, Romer deals with questions of equal protection for gay people,
and forbids legislation that would specifically deny civil rights protections
for gays, lesbians and bisexuals.90 For the dissent, then, the choice of Romer
is equally obvious.
The different questions each side asks gets them to these varying
precedents, and neatly embodies the status versus conduct divide.
1. Hardwick in the majority opinion
Ironically, the majority cites Hardwick only twice directly: once in
denying equal protection for "homosexual sodomy" 9 1 and once to deny that
federal constitutional privacy protection covers Lawrence and Garner's sex
lives.92 It cites other cases more often, and, given how long the decision is,
Hardwick seems, on first examination, swamped by other authorities. But
the majority opinion in Hardwick echoes through the Lawrence decision, at
88. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
89. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 634 (1996).
90. See id. at 635. In fact, as discussed below, the majority in Lawrence talks about
sexual orientation only in order to dismiss it as a meaningful concern for the disposition of the
case. See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353-55.
91. Lawrence I, Nos. 14-99-00109 & 14-99-00111, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760 (Tex.
App. 2000).
92. Id. at *8.
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times so powerfully that it appears to be throwing its voice into the Texas
court's mouth. The spirit of Hardwick haunts almost every rhetorical move
the Texas majority makes, particularly in its choice, use, and disregard of
other authorities.
The majority opinion in Hardwick is quite sparse. Once the reader gets
beyond the facts of the case and the various issues involved, the decision
itself is just under six printed pages. 93 Although the Court invokes dozens of
precedential decisions, it discusses almost none of them in any depth.
Moreover, it barely supports its central argument, that there is no
"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy." 94 The Court invokes
authorities in large part to deem them irrelevant.
The Court's first significant use of authority occurs in its initial analysis
of the privacy issue. It notes its disagreement with the Court of Appeals's
reference to the central precedents in the development of the privacy
doctrine and lists at length the etiology of the lower court's argument, a
string cite of ten cases, accompanied by brief explanatory phrases. 95 After
this catalogue of precedents for a privacy argument, the majority announces:
"we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy." 9 6 But despite (or perhaps because of) how
evident the Court believes its opinion to be, this statement remains free of
any reference to supporting authority.
This pattern is repeated three more times: once when a slightly more
detailed analysis of Griswold and Carey precedes the unsupported statement
that the Court is "quite unwilling (to announce] . . . a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy;" 97 once when a similar string of citations
and brief descriptions deems irrelevant the issue of fundamental liberties,
followed by the unsupported declaration that "[iut is obvious to us that
neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy;" 98 and once after a
93. In the U.S. Reporter, Justice White's opinion begins at the end of page 187 and ends
in the middle of page 196. The first two and a half pages, however, are taken up with
procedural history, leaving only six pages of analysis. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 187-96.
94. Seeid. at l91.
95. For example, it cites Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), for family
relationships; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), for procreation;
Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967), for marriage; Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v.
Baird for contraception, and so on. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
96. Harwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
97. Id. at 191.
98. Id. at 192.
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catalogue of the sodomy laws of other states (even those that had been
overturned or repealed), followed a few paragraphs later by the authority-
free assertion that the legitimacy of Georgia's sodomy law rests upon 'the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable,"' and that "[t]he law ... is constantly
based on notions of morality." 99
Indeed, the only affirmative contention the court provides for the
constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy law is that all the states at some
point had laws forbidding sodomy in some form. 100 It achieves this in
exactly the same way: through a lengthy list of sodomy laws enacted in
various state, beginning in the years just after independence and reaching
into the 1970s. However, no meaningful authority attaches to the Court's
central thesis, which is that the justices of the majority "are unwilling" to
decide that "homosexual sodomy" should not be punishable by law, because
it always has been and hence always should be. 10 1 At bottom, the Court's
stance is comparable to the exasperated parent's resort to "because I say so."
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence1 02 picks up the issue of the morality
of law, as well as the assumption that the "ancient roots"'103 of sodomy law
invoked by the majority constitute a legitimate basis for continued
enforcement. To his credit, Burger cites a variety of sources to support his
contention that sodomy has been considered so appalling throughout
Western history that overturning sodomy laws is culturally unthinkable. 104
Burger traces a trajectory of prohibitions on sodomy "without specifying
what those prohibitions embraced" from "Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards" to "Roman law" to the statutes of Henry VIII and the
commentaries of Blackstone, which excoriated the "infamous crime against
nature." 10 5 Citing no recent precedent, or any other meaningful legal basis
99. Id. at 196.
100. See id. at 193. Although the Court acknowledged that by 1986 fewer than half the
states had such laws on the books.
101. See id. at 191-94.
102. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Powell's separate concurrence
does not analyze the constitutionality of the sodomy statute, except with respect to the Eighth
Amendment issue of whether or not the punishment Georgia metes out for sodomy constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, and accordingly is not discussed here.
103. Id. at 192.
104. Id. A number of scholars have soundly criticized the Court's version of history.
See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
105. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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for his conclusions, Burger's position can be reduced to "God said it, we've
always believed it, that settles it."
These intertwined rhetorical strategies in the deployment of authority
saturate Lawrence. Unlike Hardwick, the majority in Lawrence goes into
significant detail in its use of authorities, but the structural role of authority
is strikingly similar. The foundation for the court's dismissing the
appellants' claim of equal protection is an analysis of race-based application
of the Fourteenth Amendment, analogous to the Supreme Court's dismissal
of Michael Hardwick's claim of a right to privacy. However, rather than just
citing a list of cases, the Lawrence decision first affirms the centrality of
equal protection principles to American law, asserting that "[t]he universal
application of law to all citizens has been a tenet of English common law
since at least the Magna Carta, and our whole system of law is predicated
upon this fundamental principle,"' 106 and citing to Truax v. Corrigan.10 7 The
majority then traces the development of equal protection law from the
Amistad case of 1841,108 through the Emancipation Proclamation, the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the struggles against legalized
segregation. 109 This tour of historical authority leads the majority to
conclude that "the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "'is to
prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on
the basis of race."' 1 10
By constructing its equal protection authorities solely through the lens of
race, the majority can affirm that the Texas Constitution serves to "prevent
any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject
for discriminating or hostile legislation,""' a mandate that matches the
federal guarantee of equal protection, while simultaneously maintaining that
sexual orientation is not a suspect classification that might be covered by
106. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 351 (Tex. App. 2001).
107. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
108. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841).
109. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 351.
110. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993)). It is worth noting that
nowhere does the majority reflect upon the United States's shameful judicial history of
allowing and even approving discrimination on the basis of race, most notoriously in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This selective narration allows the court to ignore possible
analogies between the legacy of race-based discrimination (and the eventual repudiation of
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)) and the recent history of
judicial decisions implicating sexual orientation, and to limit the reach of equal protection to
race.
111. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 352 (citing Burroughs v. Lyles, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574
(Tex. 1944)).
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this protection. The court quite directly observes that "neither the United
States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court, nor the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has found sexual orientation to be a 'suspect class."' 112
Given the indisputable truth of this assertion, one might ask why the
majority needed two full pages of narrative and citation to get to this point.
Like the Hardwick Court, the Lawrence majority rehearses the central
authorities in equal protection doctrine only to deem them irrelevant to the
case at hand.
As in the Hardwick decision, the Lawrence majority marshals
considerable authority to disregard the appellants' arguments and follows
this with an unsupported assertion that lies at the foundation of the court's
opinion. The Texas judges get there quite differently, however. Thanks to
the "Ellen effect," they cannot ignore the possibility that sodomy laws
disproportionately affect a certain segment of the population, "those
possessing a homosexual 'orientation.""1 13  But they counter this
acknowledgment with the assertion that the possibility of disparate
enforcement of the statute can be permissible "if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest." 114 The state interest that the majority posits as
upholding this statute is "preserving public morals." 115 This statement is
followed by a substantial list of footnoted examples of cases in which courts
from around the country have placed the preservation of morality above
personal liberty, and capped off by an in-text reference to the Hardwick
Court's belief that "[miost, if not all, of our law is 'based on notions of
morality.' ' ' 116 However, nowhere in this discussion does the Lawrence
majority prove that free exercise of sodomy by homosexuals is deleterious to
public morality nor does it define what morality is, or what it is that needs to
be protected. Once again, the court provides the most extensive authority for
side points and minor illustrations, which serves to camouflage the absence
of authority for its central argument.
112. Id. at 353-54.
113. Id. at 354. This discussion falls under a section titled "Sexual Orientation," which
is proof of how much judicial understandings of the issues at stake in sodomy law cases have
changed since the days of the Hardwick decision, when the concept of sexual orientation
would have been unthinkable. Nonetheless, the court is chaffing somewhat under the new
regime, evident in its use of quotation marks. Note, in contrast, the lack of quotation marks in
the majority's discussion of "deviate sexual intercourse." Id. at 350; see also id. at 367
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 354.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 196 (1986)).
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The specter of Hardwick is most plainly present at the end of the
Lawrence decision, in its analysis of the appellants' claim to protection
under the right to privacy. Here, the majority takes the skeleton argument in
Hardwick and puts a substantial amount of flesh on its bones. Starting, as the
Hardwick majority did, with the history of federal privacy decisions, focused
on Griswold, the court moves quickly into a discussion of the historical
authorities at the core of the Burger concurrence. But rather than spending
only a few sentences on this, the decision lingers over several paragraphs,
citing not only Blackstone, but also Francis Whatnot's 1885 A Treatise on
Criminal Law, the Institutes of Justinian, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the
Law, as well as Hardwick itself.117 At the same time, the majority refuses to
see the actions of other states in repealing or overturning their sodomy
statutes as relevant precedent, aligning such changes with "cultural trends
and political movements," and not as worthy of consideration as the
centuries-or even millennia--old authorities used to defend Texas's
sodomy statute. 118 In fact, the only current case that the majority sees as
applicable in its privacy discussions is Bowers v. Hardwick.1 19
2. Romer in the dissenting opinion
Just as Hardwick acts as the template for the majority opinion in
Lawrence, Romer v. Evans is foundational for the dissent. In many ways, the
dissent's use of Romer is structurally similar to the majority's deployment of
Hardwick. While the dissenting opinion spends most of its time on other
issues and other precedents, and Romer is discussed only in one section
about half way through the opinion, the influence of Romer is everywhere,
and underlies the logic of the entire dissent. This is particularly noticeable in
the dissent's quick dispensing with Hardwick. The opinion acknowledges
that Hardwick is controlling on the question of the appellants' federal right
117. Of course, what is absent in this survey is an acknowledgment that the acts
referred to as the "crime against nature" and cited by Blackstone, Montesquieu, Justinian, and
others in the premodern era were not the same as the conduct prohibited by Texas statute. See
TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994).
118. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 362. An additional irony is that the majority is more than
willing to look to recent decisions other states in their discussion of the legislation of public
morality: the opinion cites cases upholding diverse morality statutes decided between 1985
and 2000 from Pennsylvania, Kansas, Tennessee, and Rhode Island, mentioning only one
Texas case. Id. at 354 nn.9-14.
119. Id.
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to privacy, 120 but having acceded that point, no longer finds Hardwick a
relevant authority for the equal protection issues before the court.
From the very beginning of its opinion, the dissent uses a notion of equal
protection to assume that laws cannot treat distinct groups disparately, and
does so primarily through its discussion of gender. Citing In re McLean,121
the leading case interpreting the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, the dissent
immediately brings up the issue of gender as a suspect classification,
something that the majority, in its initial dependence on authorities around
race-based discrimination, defers to a separate analysis outside its larger
equal protection discussion. The dissent's goal in this analysis is to show
that "[s]ection 21.06 is not gender neutral," opposing the majority's
assertion that "it does not impose burdens on one gender not shared by the
other." 122
In order to support this argument, the dissent imagines a scenario with
three actors: Bob, Alice and Cathy:
Bob approaches Alice, and with her consent, engages with her in several
varieties of "deviate sexual intercourse," the conduct at issue here. Bob then
leaves the room. Cathy approaches Alice, and with her consent, engages with
her in several kinds of "deviate sexual intercourse." Cathy is promptly
arrested for violating section 21.06.123
The dissent uses this scenario to show that the gender distinction is
relevant to the statute. Bob is not arrested "because he is a man . . . but
because she is a woman, Cathy is a criminal." 124 The only difference
between Bob and Cathy is their gender, since conceivably they could have
been engaging in precisely the same behaviors with Alice. What is striking
here is the dissent's assertion that "Cathy is a criminal. ' 125 After all, is
Alice not equally culpable in the performance of "deviate sexual
intercourse" with Cathy? And given the parameters of the statute, should she
not also have been arrested (particularly since both Lawrence and Garner
were named in this case, implying that both partners are equally
responsible)?
120. Id. at 366 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
121. 725 SW.2d 696 (Tex. 1987) (construing the Texas Equal Rights Amendment as
elevating sex to a suspect classification).
122. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 368 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
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The implication of the dissent's structuring of this story is that Cathy's
engaging in sexual activity with Alice is shaped by her identity as a lesbian.
Here, "Cathy" appears to stand in for the identity of "lesbian," and hence
liable to prosecution in ways not applicable to "Alice," who thus constitutes
little more than the ground upon which Bob and Cathy exercise, not just
sexual behaviors, but their social identities as "straight man" or "gay
woman."' 126 Ironically, the dissent is implicitly agreeing with the majority's
position that not only lesbian and gay people participate in the prohibited
behavior. This story suggests, however, that homosexuals are differently
treated under the statute: Cathy gets arrested, Alice does not. Underlying the
dissent's analysis of the difference between Cathy and Alice is its reliance
on Romer. Romer took as central to its opinion that gay men and lesbian
women constituted an identifiable group separate from the majority,
discriminated against, and deserving of protection as such.
The dissent "indulge[s] in this tableau" 127 in order to set up its
consequent contention that the "equal discrimination argument [is] not a
cure" for the statute's unconstitutionality under the Texas ERA. 128 That is to
say, although the statute makes no distinction between acts performed
between women and those performed between men, the very fact that
lesbians such as "Cathy" and gay men such as Lawrence and Garner are
disproportionately affected by it is an abrogation of the equal protection
rights laid out in Romer. More importantly, the historical animus towards
homosexuality that the majority uses as one of its central authorities in
upholding section 21.06 is for the dissent, following Romer, one of the main
reasons the statute should be overturned. As the opinion asserts, "[b]ecause
[Colorado's] Amendment 2 drew such a classification, and then proceeded
to disadvantage homosexuals because of their membership in the class, the
amendment violated the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment." 129
As Justice Anderson maintains, section 21.06 follows a similar pattern
to Amendment 2 in "draw[ing] a classification for the purpose of
126. An alternative reading might posit Alice as bisexual. Indeed, Colorado's
Amendment 2 included bisexual people as outside the pale of protection from discrimination,
along with lesbian women and gay men. But whether she is being treated as bisexual or
simply a stand-in for the open sexual possibility disconnected from identity, it is clear that the
dissent is using Alice differently from the way it uses Cathy, the metaphorical lesbian.
127. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 368.
128. Id. at 369.
129. Id. at 377-78.
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disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." 130 In fact, the dissent notes,
Justice Scalia, in his dissent to Romer, readily agreed that, "there can hardly
be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that
defines the class criminal."' 13 1 The ironies here are abundant. On the one
hand, the Lawrence dissent invokes Romer to oppose the classification of a
group for the sole purpose of discriminating against them. On the other, it
appropriates the language of Supreme Court Justice Scalia, a vocal opponent
of Romer, to support its use of the very opinion from which he was
dissenting. In the context of his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia was implicitly
supporting Hardwick's upholding of sodomy laws, and explicitly arguing
that since such laws already criminalize "homosexuals," a de facto act of
discrimination, the Romer majority's ruling that Amendment 2 unfairly
denied antidiscrimination protection could not be sustained for a group that
the Supreme Court itself had already deemed liable to criminalization. 132 In
other words, Romer's invocation of sexual orientation as an identifiable
legal category has such a powerful effect that it transforms the meaning of
all other (even opposite) analyses of the meanings of sexuality.
This is the "Ellen effect" in action. In using Romer in this way, the
dissent cannot help but construct lesbian women and gay men as a group and
as individual people. Using such a conception of identity as a given, the
dissent inevitably interprets section 21.06 as treating people unequally based
on categories of identity and hence as unconstitutionally denying those
people their right to equal protection under the law. Thus, the Lawrence
dissent re-engages with the status/conduct debate so as to affirm the
centrality of status and dispute the majority's focus on gender- and
sexuality-neutral conduct.
D. The Rhetoric ofAuthority
1. Using Hardwick versus Romer
So far this Article has discussed what it means to organize a decision
around certain cases in terms of content. Just as Hardwick invokes certain
130. Id. at 378.
131. Id. at 378 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
132. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 641. For a much more thorough discussion of the
"criminalizing effect" sodomy statutes have on certain classes of people, see Christopher R.
Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000).
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authorities and uses certain strategies around its deployment of authority, the
majority in Lawrence borrows those same sources and those same strategies
to lay out the content of its decision. Or, just as Romer's attitude towards the
meaning of sexual orientation shapes the majority's opinion in that case, the
Lawrence dissent's reliance upon Romer implies a similar sense of the
political shape of sexuality in relation to the state.
Authority does not simply affect the content of a decision or a dissent-
its resonance is much deeper. The deployment of an authority is, in and of
itself, a rhetorical move. 133 That is to say, the very appearance of a case like
Hardwick as an affirmative authority (rather than as something to dispose of
before moving onto the "real" argument) sends a message to the reader about
the intentions of the decision. The use of the phrase "as the Supreme Court
held in Bowers v. Hardwick" in a sodomy case immediately signals to the
reader that the opinion will support not only the constitutionality of sodomy
statutes but an entire worldview about the relevance (or, rather, irrelevance)
of sexual orientation.
The same holds for Romer. In order to cite Romer as a meaningful
authority at all, judges must subscribe to the Romer majority's view of
sexual orientation and its relation to constitutional standards of equal
protection. One might even argue that without this understanding of the role
of sexuality, Romer makes no sense-which is borne out by the inability of
the Lawrence majority and dissent to speak to each other.134 Hardwick and
133. This theory is indebted to the groundbreaking work of Anthony G. Amsterdam on
the rhetoric of legal narrative. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE
LAW (2000); Anthony Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a
Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 55 (1992). For further examples of scholarship bringing
rhetorical analysis to bear on legal decisionmaking, see STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL
STUDIES (1989); LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul
D. Gewirtz eds., 1996); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICs OF LAW (1985); Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating
the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 92 (1994); Andrew M. Jacobs,
God Save this Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and the Transformation of the
Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119 (1995); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CH. L. REV. 1477
(1995); Mark Strasser, Loving, Baehr and the Right to Marry: On Legal Argumentation and
Sophistical Rhetoric, 24 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2000); Timothy E. Lin, Note, Social Norms and
Judicial Decision-making: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 739 (1999).
134. The issue here is one of belief system, and therefore, effectively, one of faith. As
my late colleague Peter Cicchino observed, these arguments encapsulate St. Augustine's
axiom that "For those who believe, no argument is necessary. For those who do not believe,
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Romer carry such intense, and opposite, ideological charges that the
invocation of one or the other by name alone attracts or repels an array of
related stances. 135 Conversely, if a court wants to support a given position
on sexual orientation, bringing in Romer or Hardwick does a significant
amount of rhetorical work aside from the specifics of the opinion itself. Each
case provides a frame within which judges can then plumb in reasoning that
is directly on point.
At the same time, although Romer and Hardwick seem immovable in
relation to their given ideological positions, the rhetoric of authority is not
inflexible. Courts can, in fact, alter the charge around cases by resituating
them outside their customary use. This can sometimes seem quite shocking.
If readers assume that the appearance of a specific case signals the
deployment of an attendant set of beliefs, the recontextualization of that case
as a rhetorical tool can, ironically, lend additional power to the previously
"opposite" side. A striking example of this is the Lawrence dissent's use and
appropriation of Loving v. Virginia. 136
2. Using Loving
For the dissent in Lawrence, Loving is crucial in terms of both content
and rhetoric. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Loving that Virginia's anti-
miscegenation law was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly called upon the
mandate established by Korematsu v. United States that legal distinctions
based on race should be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny" 137 and that if
such distinctions are to be upheld "they must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state object, independent of...
racial discrimination." 138 As well as invoking the language of heightened
scrutiny, the Loving majority also took a firm stand against Virginia's
no argument is sufficient." Peter Cicchino & Kris Franklin, Letter to the Editor, THE
COMMENTATOR, N.Y.U. School of Law, Oct. 22, 1997, at 2-3 (copy on file with the author).
135. There are many examples of the ways in which the mention of a single name or
phrase invokes an entire rhetorical landscape: "Nixon," "Tiananmen Square," "1968," "big
tobacco," "Whitewater," all summon up in the listener's imagination whole host of
interconnected images and beliefs. The use of the phrase "big tobacco," for example,
immediately signals to the interlocutor a set of attitudes about industry, the role of government
regulation, the trustworthiness of corporate executives, the validity of certain uses of tort law,
and the relationship between personal responsibility and the sway of advertising.
136. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
137. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1994).
138. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
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contention that its anti-miscegenation law did not violate equal protection,
since it affected white people desiring to marry blacks to the same extent
that it prevented black people from marrying whites. 139 The Court held that
"Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn
according to race." 140 According to the concurrence "[t]he fact that Virginia
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons [for example
marriages between American Indians and blacks were not criminalized]
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own
justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."' 14 1
The Lawrence dissent calls upon Loving by analogy. While the State of
Texas argued that section 21.06 punished men equally to women, the dissent
maintained that, as in the Virginia miscegenation statute, the Texas law
prohibited same-sex "deviate sexual intercourse"' 142 in such a way as to
discriminate against an identifiable class of people: lesbian women and gay
men. By raising Loving as precedent, the dissent implicitly but powerfully
analogized racial identity with sexual orientation. 143 Loving's insistence on
miscegenation laws as discriminating according to social category (in this
case race) lends force to the Lawrence dissent's assertion that sexual
orientation constitutes a classification that demands equal protection under
the law on the same terms.
Loving's rhetorical import is a little more difficult to tease out, but no
less palpable. Certainly, the dissent in Lawrence can point to Loving as
direct legal precedent. But it is also summoning Loving as moral or ethical
precedent. Anti-miscegenation laws were among the most deeply rooted
forces of white supremacy, and one of the last to disappear from the books
(after all, Loving was decided thirteen years after Brown and three years
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The fear among
segregationists of "social equality" was at bottom a horror of sexual equality
between black and white, 144 particularly black men and white women. 14 5
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id.
142. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 70.
143. Of course, neither the Lawrence court nor the advocates before it originated the
Loving analogy. Cass Sunstein raised the issue in a 1994 lecture, Cass R. Sunstein,
Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1994), and Andrew Koppelman
discussed it in more detail in his Note, The Miscegination Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 154-55, 162, 164 (1998).
144. A fact that makes the name of the case all the more ironic.
145. A fascinating example of this can be found in W.T. Couch's introduction to
Rayford Logan's What the Negro Wants. Writing in the 1940s, Couch, a gradualist who
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Loving repudiated this last bastion of legalized white rule, and thereby
claimed a moral high ground based in the principles of equal protection
under the law.
For the dissent in Lawrence, then, Loving embodies the power of the
courts to rise above prejudice, and represents the possibility of a social
justice that places lesbian and gay civil rights on the same level as racial
equality. Moreover, the very phrase "Loving v. Virginia" represents
something larger than the decision itself. It epitomizes an opposition to
bigotry, to entrenched systems of discrimination, and to invidious
distinctions rooted in the fear of sexual freedom. The rhetorical analogy,
therefore, becomes self-evident. Just as Loving condemned segregationists'
racist obsession with black sexuality, the dissent in Lawrence shines a light
on the Texas statute's homophobic preoccupation with the sexual lives of
lesbian women and gay men.
If the dissent is right that agreeing with Loving puts it on the side of the
angels, where does that put the majority? According to the court's legal
analysis of section 21.06, Loving seems irrelevant, because the central issue
for the court is whether or not the legislature is permitted to make and
enforce moral judgments regarding same-sex sexual conduct.146 The
rhetorical implications of Loving, however-that to have Loving on your
side is a sign of the justice of your position-overwhelm the majority's
resistance to using the case. 147
assumes that pushing too hard for integration and equal civil rights for African-Americans will
arouse his readers' terror of miscegination, is astonishing in his attempts to reassure the reader
that civil rights would not require racial intermixing. W.T. Couch, Introduction to RAYFORD
W. LOGAN, WHAT THE NEGRO WANTS ix, xv n.4 (Rayford W. Logan ed., The University of
North Carolina Press 1944).
The mythic justification for lynching was the rape of white women by black men.
Terance Finnegan, Lynching and Political Power in Mississippi and South Carolina, in
UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SoUTH 189-218 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed.,
1997). In fact, as Finnegan has proven through meticulous research, the majority of lynchings
from the 1880's onward were due to the victim's assault or murder of a white person.
146. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 352.
147. It is important to note, though, that there is a history to this relationship to
Loving. The majority in Lawrence I relied heavily upon Loving to make its equal protection
argument. After introducing Loving as precedent, the majority states that "[m]erely punishing
men who engage in sodomy with other men and women who engage in sodomy with other
women equally, does not salvage the discriminatory classification contained in this statute."
Lawrence I, Nos. 14-99-00109 & 14-99-00111, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760, at *13 (Tex.
App. 2000). Moreover, the majority explicitly used the language of "strict scrutiny" in terms
of "sex-based classification," aligning its decision with that of the majority in Loving. Id.
Therefore, this strong use of Loving may account for the majority in Lawrence's focus on the
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Like the dissent, the majority couches its analysis of Loving in the
context of the civil rights struggle. But the court brings up Loving only after
having gone through a fairly extensive catalogue of African Americans'
fight for equal protection under law, and its dismissal of sexual orientation
as an analogous classification. 148 By disarticulating the linkage between
race and sexuality that informs both the majority in Lawrence I and the
dissent in Lawrence, the majority in Lawrence I can corral Loving into its
stable of cases without acknowledging the rhetorical meanings the dissent
attaches to it.
In fact, by literalizing Loving, the majority deploys the case to
delegitimate the claim of equal protection for sexual orientation. Moreover,
the majority's appropriation of Loving provided space for the court to assert
the absolute difference between race and sexual orientation without having
to cite any additional authority. Utterly without support, the court maintains
"that while the purpose of Virginia's miscegenation statute was to segregate
the races and perpetuate the notion that blacks are inferior to whites, no such
sinister motive can be ascribed to the criminalization of homosexual
conduct." 149 This conclusion comes at the tail end of multiparagraph
analysis of Loving, which serves precisely to obscure the fact that this final
statement is supported only by its own logic, not by authority.
In this way, the majority can seemingly participate in the rhetorical
meanings of Loving while rejecting the case as a template for other forms of
social justice. Focusing exclusively on racial discrimination, the court can,
in response to the dissent's rhetorical positioning, also side with the angels
(segregation was bad!) and deny the legitimacy of the appellants' case by
minimizing the effects of homophobic law. 150 More remarkably, the
majority denies that Loving has anything to say about homosexuality at all.
case, particularly since the Lawrence I dissent, which held the same position, did not feel the
need to cite it.
148. In his concurrence, Justice Fowler makes a similar move. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at
365 (Fowler, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 357. Of course, Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer belies this assumption,
since, as noted in footnote 32, he cites sodomy laws as the justification for measures like
Colorado's Amendment 2, that is, a population defined by criminal behavior cannot be
protected from discrimination, since criminaization constitutes discrimination rooted in
legitimate law. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996).
150. This is similar to the tendency of conservatives to appropriate the message of
Martin Luther King, Jr., particularly the "I Have a Dream" speech, and to use King's very
words to oppose the kind of racial and economic justice (such as affirmative action) that he
himself clearly supported. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, I MAY NOT GET THERE WITH You: THE
TRUE MARTtN LUTHER KING, JR. 11-29 (2000).
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Instead, it couches its analysis of the decision in a section on gender
discrimination, and concludes that no "sinister motive can be ascribed to the
criminalization of homosexual conduct" and "the appellants' reliance on
Loving [is] unpersuasive" because the court found "nothing in the history of
Section 21.06 to suggest it was intended to promote any hostility between
the sexes, preserve any unequal treatment as between men and women, or
perpetuate any societal or cultural bias with regard to gender." 15 1 Magically,
sexual orientation disappeared as a concern that Loving might have raised,
because the only meaningful classifications are race and, as a close second,
gender.
This use of Loving defangs it rhetorically, which raises the question of
why the case is in the majority decision at all, since the point of using
Loving is to trade on its power. One easy answer is that Loving is used so
extensively in the dissent and, more importantly, in the majority in Lawrence
. But that is not all. Rather, because of the "Ellen effect," the analogy
between race and sexual orientation has common currency. This makes it
much harder for the Lawrence majority to do what the Hardwick majority
did with ease: ignore the potential civil rights issues that sodomy laws may
entail. The combination of the "Ellen effect" and the vigorous dissent makes
it more politically complicated for the court to appear to align itself with
bigotry. Therefore, the court invokes Loving in order rhetorically to
acknowledge the cultural power of civil rights claims, and then to define this
issue as distinct from them. 152
3. Introducing further support
Thus far, we have moved from the contrasting federal authorities that
provide the philosophical center for the opinions in Lawrence to Loving,
which is so crucial in one opinion that it must be explicitly defined as
irrelevant in the other. The next step of the analysis is to examine authorities
about which the parties must make more self-conscious choices to introduce
and rely upon.
Unlike the rhetorically determinative authorities such as Hardwick and
Romer, some authorities are more rhetorically up for grabs. They do not bear
heavy ideological weight, and can be marshaled for any number of purposes.
For example, both the majority and the dissent in Lawrence use City of
151. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357-58.
152. The dissent seems well aware of this process. The tone of its discussion of Loving
suggests that it is attempting to wrest the case back from the uses the majority has put it to.
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Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 153 as defining the contemporary
meaning of constitutional analysis of appropriate levels of scrutiny under
equal protection. 154 But the majority passes through it quickly, pausing only
to note that the case stands as an indicator that the rational basis test is the
correct one in a case not dealing with classifications of persons by "race,
alienage, or national origin." 155 The dissent, on the other hand, develops a
much more complicated reading of the rational basis test, to come to a
conclusion that a statute making some group's difference in a markedly
negative way fails this test. 156
Since Cleburne is a fairly flexible authority here, the two opinions
simply enlist it to support their core arguments: that gay people are or are
not a group, and as a group are or are not worthy of equal protection. The
majority has already established, through its dependence upon Hardwick and
its adaptation of Loving, that sexual orientation is not a meaningful
classification. Cleburne is then just a side point, a base that needs covering
in order to decide that minimal scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply
in evaluating section 21.06. In contrast, the dissent establishes early on that
lesbian women and gay men are comparable as a group to those included in
racial classifications, even if not covered by the heightened scrutiny
accorded to race. 157  Moreover, the dissent picks up on the majority's
chronicling of the historical condemnation of same sex sodomy, a narrative
the court borrows from Hardwick, and turns it to its own purpose. 158 Using
the logic of Cleburne, the dissent asserts that the very reason the majority
believed that homosexuality should be condemned (people have always
opposed it), should lead the court to the "unavoidable conclusion.., that the
statute was merely a continuation of the stereotyped reaction to a
traditionally disfavored group." 159 Hence, under the dissent's Cleburne
analysis, even the rational basis test must find that section 21.06 violates the
Texas Constitution. 160
Thus, for the majority and dissent, historical narrative can function as
authority underpinning legal reasoning. In fact, the dissent co-opts the
153. 473 U.S. 432 (1995) (holding that a group home for mentally retarded adults
could not be prohibited by local zoning ordinance without a rational basis for such exclusion).
154. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353, 378-80 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 352.
156. See id. at 380.
157. See id. (noting that "homosexuals have been subject to a tradition of disfavor").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 380.
160. Id.
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majority's argument from history by explicitly referring to it and then
applying it to the opposite rationale. Used this way, history can be a
convincing authority for a particular position, although the historical
narrative itself does not determine what kind of reasoning it will be used to
support.
This raises a larger question: when and how do courts rely on social,
political, and historical data and/or take notice of contemporary social reality
beyond the strictures of legal precedent? And what are the rhetorical
meanings of such information? Often it may be that judges are borrowing
this material from advocates who are seeking to change the status quo. It
stands to reason that such advocates are themselves most likely to use this
kind of authority, since relying on legal precedent supposes a certain
conventionality and satisfaction with current legal standards. Judges then
have the option of folding non-precedential sources into decisions,
transforming them into important sites of authority.
One of the most obvious and memorable examples of this phenomenon
is the Supreme Court's use of the so-called doll studies in Brown. 16 1 Since
the binding legal authority before the Brown Court was the odious Plessy v.
Ferguson,162 the only way to counter this precedent was to render
authoritative a competing set of concepts. In Brown, then, the Court defined
as a central issue the social science data that was not available at the time
Plessy was rendered, creating an avenue for the Court to address the simple
fact that the social climate in 1954 was very different from that of the 1890s.
The Brown Court used the doll studies in the spirit in which they were
designed-to show that segregation created a sense of inequality and
worthlessness in the minds of African-Americans, particularly children. 163
161. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.1 1 (1954) (citing KENNETH BANCROFT
CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT:
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT FOR THE USE OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON FACT FINDING (1950); E.
FRANKLIN FRAzIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674-81 (1949); Theodore Bremald,
Educational Costs, in DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE 44-48 (Maclver ed., 1949);
Isidor Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal
Facilities?, 3 INT'L J. OPINION & ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); M. Deutscher et al., The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.
PSYCHOL 259 (1948).
162. 163 U.S. 537, 537 (1986).
163. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.l 1. For a discussion of the rhetorical use of the harms
of segregation on African-American schoolchildren, see Peggy Cooper Davis, Performing
Interpretation: A Legacy of Civil Rights Lawyering in Brown v. Board of Education, in RACE,
LAW AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 23, 27-32 (Austin Sarat
ed., 1997).
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However, the seeming intentions of a historical or social authority do not
need to jibe with the needs of an opinion in order to be called into use. In
addition, a history of use of a certain authority to support one argument does
not preclude the deployment of the same material to support the opposite
position. Just as the Lawrence court does with Loving, the majority imports
the findings of Dr. Alfred Kinsey's sexuality studies in order to support its
contention that section 21.06 does not on its face discriminate against an
identifiable class of people.
Leaning on Kinsey's findings, the majority reasons that since "[p]ersons
having a predominantly heterosexual inclination may sometimes engage in
homosexual conduct ... [section 21.06's] proscription applies ... without
respect to a defendant's sexual orientation."' 164 Therefore, for the majority,
Kinsey's study can support the conclusion that the statute in question does
not discriminate against gay people. This runs directly counter to the ways in
which Kinsey's work has for years been used to support the civil rights of
lesbians and gay men. Kinsey's conclusion that a variety of sexual behaviors
are spread across the spectrum of sexual identities helped to normalize
homosexuality and grant equal human dignity to gay people and same-sex
sexual practice. 165 To supporters of gay rights, the majority's appropriation
of Kinsey might seem shocking, but it serves as a sign of the flexibility of
social observations as legal authority.
Accordingly, when judges use such material, regardless of whether or
not they are depending upon what advocates have argued, they are
recognizing law as a social and political force, and acknowledging the
influence of social and political forces on the law. 166 Sometimes this takes
the form of carefully documented references to historical and social
scientific texts. 167 Other times it is mentioned only in passing1 68 or as a
164. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353.
165. Examples of this application of Kinsey's work are abound. For one early and
influential such use, see COMMiTrEE ON HOMOSEXUALITY AND PROSTITUTION, THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT 27-36 (Am. ed. 1963) (1957).
166. As E.F. Roberts wryly observed: "U]udicial notice is the art of thinking as
practiced within the legal system." E.F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of
Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210, 236 (1967).
167. See for example, the Lawrence court's extensive discussion of statutory
proscription of same-sex sodomy. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 361.
168. See the Lawrence dissent's brief mention of the debate over the State's interest in
the "promotion of family values." Id. at 373 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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given. 169 But the function is the same: to turn an observation of how the
world works into a source of law. The content of that observation, or its
genesis in social analysis, may be merely a helpful addendum to the court's
legal reasoning or may, as we have seen, predetermine it.
4. Omitting support
Although it is the style of legal writing to cite authorities to the point of
obsession, occasionally legal writers will just come out and say what they
think. Courts will offer what they see as a common sense, or at least
commonly accepted, view of the world without citation. Needless to say,
what courts assume to be that uncontroversial or incontrovertible itself
reveals a great deal about judges' ideological orientations.
Often courts make sweeping conclusions without authority because,
rhetorically, they see themselves as simply summarizing the precedent-based
interpretations that they have already laid out. For example, the Lawrence
majority concludes that "the legislature could have concluded that deviant
sexual intercourse, when performed by members of the same sex, is an act
different from or more offensive than any such conduct performed by
members of the opposite sex," and impliedly asserts that such a
determination would be unequivocally permissible in a regulatory
scheme. 170 While this statement is itself unsupported, it follows a paragraph
of analysis of differential treatments of variations on the same offense: some
homicides are judged capital offenses, some as first degree felonies, some
second degree, and so on, with each example supported with individual
footnotes linked to relevant clauses in the Texas Penal code. 171 The court's
positioning of its assertion, thus, indicates that it sees the differential
treatment of sexual behaviors as directly analogous to these other
differentiations in criminal law, and therefore this unsupported assertion is
offered merely to summarize the court's interpretation, not to introduce a
new idea. 17 2
169. See, for example, the reference in the Lawrence I dissent to the "divinely
instituted principles" upon which laws rest. Lawrence 1, 200 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760, at *32-
*33.
170. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 356.
171. Id.
172. One might quibble with the court's contention that a change in gender of sex
partner is analogous to the difference between murder for hire and negligent homicide, but it
is unfair to attack to court's lack of citation for this assertion since it sees itself as having built
the interpretation upon a solid foundation in law.
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But when courts employ unsupported assertions to define the paradigm
that determines (or even predetermines) their position, their lack of authority
is more questionable. Rather than coming to conclusions based on
precedential material, courts' unsupported observations often reveal the
assumptions that create their interpretations of law. The Lawrence
majority's assertion that Loving is irrelevant in analyzing section 21.06,
because "while the purpose of Virginia's miscegenation statute was to
segregate the races and perpetuate the notion that blacks are inferior to
whites, no such sinister motive can be ascribed to the criminalization of
homosexual conduct" 173 seems to depend upon the court's lengthy
discussion of equal protection legislation, but is, in fact, wholly
unsupported. Similarly, the legal conclusions that the dissent draws from to
create its "Cathy and Bob and Alice" scenario are nearly devoid of
authority. 174
These assertions lie at the core of the majority's and dissent's positions,
which raises the question why in the conservative discipline of judicial
decision-making, such a central analysis is not connected in any meaningful
way to binding statutory or common law authority. There are at least two
possible explanations for this. Either the writers believe their conclusions
are so self-evident and true they do not require citation, or they recognize
that their interpretations are sufficiently original that they need to claim sole
ownership of them. 175 The example from the dissent appears to have more
of the flavor of the latter strategy, since the dissent openly acknowledges
that it has constructed this narrative to make a larger point about the effects
of the statute. But the majority's bald conclusions from its discussion of
Loving are as unconnected to inherited law as the legal conclusions that the
dissent takes from this scenario.
What these opinions rhetorically claim to be doing is building an
argument and then extracting the inevitable conclusions offered up by their
evidence. Thus, the opinions' unsupported conclusions are offered in the
same spirit as interpretations that more convincingly issue from statutory
authority or legal precedent, such as the example given above of the
majority's determination that distinctions between different kinds of sodomy
173. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 356.
174. The dissent makes reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, but these are offered
only to mention that the appellants base their equal protection arguments on the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 370 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
175. Ironically, this is the model for citation determined by the MLA HANDBOOK-that
an idea need not be cited if it belongs to the culture at large, or it can be claimed only by its
writer. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
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are no more invidious than distinctions between different degrees of
homicide.
However, the cause and effect relationship is in fact reversed. The
majority's belief that gay men and lesbian women do not constitute a
meaningful class and do not deserve the same protections as minorities
shapes its analysis of Loving and its determination that anti-gay sodomy
laws have no "sinister motives." Similarly, the dissent's conception of
lesbian and gay identity predetermines its deployment of the Fourteenth
Amendments in telling the story of Cathy, Alice and Bob, and undergirds its
conclusion that section 21.06 cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. The
rhetorical effect of both conclusions, then, is to place the majority's and the
dissent's interpretations firmly within the first explanation, that is, having
simply observed the indisputable truth. Counterintuitively, the effect of
offering an unsupported assertion can be to cast it as more authoritative, that
is, as constituting its own authority.
111. CLASSIFYING AUTHORITIES
As should be clear by now, not all authorities do the same work. For
example, Hardwick functions very differently in Lawrence from Cleburne,
and Cleburne operates differently in the Lawrence majority from the work it
does in the dissent. In order to tease out these differences in meaning, it is
helpful to organize authorities into different analytical categories. At least
two overarching categories of authority emerge from the analysis of
Lawrence: what I will define as "looming authority," and "lurking
authority." Not all authorities fit neatly within these categories however, 176
and I briefly comment on a possible third classification, "methodological
authority." While there can be a fair amount of interplay between these
categories, this structure of analysis can help scholars gain a clearer
understanding of the rhetorical stakes in the deployment of authorities in
legal writing.
176. Indeed, even between the two categories there might be considerable debate as to
which authorities belong in which group. In the discussion that follows, I offer my
observations about how the primary authorities in Lawrence might be taxonomized, but I do
not intend to suggest that these interpretations are definitive, only that they can illustrate how
the proposed categories can help deepen an understanding of the meanings implicit in a
court's use of authority.
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A. Looming Authorities
Looming authorities loom. That is, they weigh heavily over an issue
being decided by a court; they appear immense and inescapable. Webster's
Dictionary encapsulates the implications of "looming" authorities perfectly:
to loom is "to come into sight in enlarged or distorted and indistinct form..
.; to appear in an impressively great or exaggerated form... ; to take shape
as an impending occurrence."' 177 Looming authorities feel "impressively
great" to legal writers, or are constructed to feel that way to the reader,
because they are seen, or can be seen, to determine the outcome of a
particular controversy.
Though overlapping, looming authorities do not map precisely onto the
traditional category of "binding authorities," because the two conceptions
come from quite different analytical frameworks. Binding authority operates
within a strict hierarchy of legal decision-making tools: once a case has been
determined to constitute binding precedent it necessarily controls the
outcome of future decisions on point. Looming authorities might be
determined to be binding in a given case, 178 but the category emerges from
an acknowledgment of the interpretive work engage in by courts. Binding
cases are those that must be dealt -with as a technical matter: on point
decisions by the same or higher court. Looming authorities, by contrast, are
those that must be dealt with as a matter of perception: binding or not, they
might shape the theoretical orientation of the court's analysis, and thus must
be addressed to maintain consensus about a decision's legitimacy, even if
they are raised only to be interpreted as not dispositive of the question
before the court.
Described this way, it is clear that Hardwick looms heavily in Lawrence.
For the majority this is an obvious analysis: after all, Hardwick provides the
blueprint for the majority's reasoning. What is more striking is how much
Hardwick looms over the dissent. In large part this is because any discussion
of sodomy law cannot help but look towards Hardwick as an authority
beyond its status as legal precedent. The case is not simply part of the legal
record: it is woven into legal culture, and juridical understandings of
regulation of homosexual conduct and, by extension, of lesbian women and
gay men. Hardwick is a touchstone of how our society, through the legal
177. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 704-05.
178. But non-binding cases can certainly loom largely. As discussed infra, Hardwick
is not binding on a state's interpretation of the privacy protections afforded under its state
constitution, but this does not mean that the Supreme Court's sodomy analysis does not loom
significantly when state courts address such questions. 1
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system, controls the lives of individuals whose sexual expression is with
others of the same gender, as well as a symbol of the contested landscape of
American sexual life. The dissent dispenses with Hardwick by relegating its
relevance to the issue of federal privacy, 179 but the case lingers over the
dissent's opinion, and infiltrates the remainder of its analysis. 180
The power of Hardwick as a looming authority is that its use in
discussions of sodomy law is automatic, not autonomic. It looms no matter
what arguments are proffered by appellants or the state, no matter what
position a court takes, and no matter what other decisions the Supreme Court
makes on lesbian and gay issues, short of overturning it. Not all looming
authorities are this primordial, however. Since what is looming is in part
determined by interpretations of preceding case law and existing statutes,
and in part a cultural construction, it necessarily follows that the sensation of
"loomingness" can itself be created, either by the parties or by alternative
interpretations on the bench.
Romer, for example, quite apparently looms as large for the dissent as
Hardwick does for the majority, because, similarly, the dissent sees it a
model for judicial analysis of the question before the court. The inverse is
not true, however. In a sodomy law context, Romer simply does not have the
iconic value that Hardwick does, 181 particularly since the majority in Romer
went out of its way to disconnect its decision from Hardwick. Romer does
have iconic value, though, in relation to the constitutionality of
discriminating against lesbian women and gay men, an issue that the dissent
brings to the fore, and hence which the majority must address.
Since the question of how much Romer informs an interpretation of the
Texas Equal Rights Amendment is at the core of the dissent's approach, the
majority has to engage the issue of civil rights in some way before moving
beyond Romer. Thus, the majority appears to dispense with Romer in a
couple of short paragraphs, by observing that it does not overrule Hardwick,
and does not directly address the regulation of "homosexual conduct." 182
179. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 366-67 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
180. This can be seen, for example, in the dissent's negative characterization of the
"contention that the same conduct is moral for some but not for others," a central component
of Hardwick's analysis, and its later repudiation of any assertion that "a valid state interest...
is rationally served by proscribing sodomy only when performed by homosexuals." id. at 367,
380.
181. I am not certain that anything in American sodomy law jurisprudence could
possibly have the same iconic value as Hardwick. It seems quite simply impossible to think
about sodomy law without immediately conjuring an image of Hardwick, regardless of
whether that image is salutary or rife with condemnation.
182. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 355.
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But the specter of discrimination against gay people that Romer raises
cannot be easily erased from the majority's consciousness. It is not difficult
to imagine that the majority's zealous retelling of the fight for African-
American civil rights in the courts 183 is a way of absolving itself from an
implicit self-criticism of having failed to afford legal protection to a minority
group in need. If this is true, the dissent has succeeded in at least one of its
efforts-it has transformed Romer into a palpable and inescapable
forerunner, that is, it has made the case loom.
The Lawrence majority and dissent both try to work through looming
authorities that are ideologically counter to their positions, and they choose
similar methods to do this: defining the authority as irrelevant. There are
other options, however, depending upon the case and the status of the court.
One possibility is simply to overturn an unfavorable but compelling
decision, or to define as unconstitutional an unfavorable but looming
statutory provision. Courts are traditionally loath to redact established legal
doctrines, but have done so on rare occasions, albeit sometimes
indirectly. 184 The Supreme Court most famously adopted this strategy in
Brown. Despite the various desegregation cases that had been decided by the
Court between 1896 and 1954,185 no case loomed larger for the Brown court
than Plessy. Brown dealt with the "loomingness" of Plessy by facing it head-
on and explicitly overruling it.186 Since the Texas Court of Appeals is in no
position to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court, it must wrestle with the
looming decisions from that Court. Thus, both opinions deal, however
tangentially, directly'with looming Supreme Court decisions that work
against their positions, as well as those which support them.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court in Romer took the opposite tack,
totally ignoring the Hardwick decision. Reading only the Romer decision,
one would not know that the Supreme Court had only ten years earlier
defined sex between members of the same gender as criminally
prosecutable. Though the. Court's narrow interpretation of the question
before it did serve to define Hardwick out of relevance, 187 the problem with
183. See id. at 351-52.
184. An example of this is the Supreme Court's ultimate rejection of its Lochner-era
substantive due process analysis began in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its
progeny, and in later decisions such as Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 501 (1934).
185. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Supreme Court
determined that a segregated law school functionally failed to provide equal facilities to white
and black students, but stopped short of determining that separate could never mean equal.
186. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954).
187. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Lawfulness of Romer v. Evans, 77 N.C. L. REv.
241, 254-58 (1998).
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this strategy is that it opens a court up to considerable criticism and can
delegitimate its decision. 188 Since it was the only significant Supreme Court
decision before Romer to address homosexuality, thereby looming large on
the topic, Hardwick's absence is not merely noticeable, it challenges for
future courts and advocates the credibility of Romer as a potential looming
authority itself. Conventional wisdom holds that the Romer Court wanted
neither to overrule Hardwick nor to follow it, 189 but this might not have
been an easy trick to accomplish. For the Romer Court, Hardwick loomed so
large that the strategies of adopting it as determinative or casting it as
unmentionably irrelevant may have been easier than pursuing the Lawrence
opinions' strategies.
Ignoring looming authority does not make it go away, however. Romer's
omission of Hardwick is, in some ways, as significant to the decision as the
majority's opinion itself, and certainly as striking to a reader. 190 Thus,
looming authority is not necessarily central to a decision, occasionally it is
represented as marginal, and sometimes is not even addressed. But it never
disappears from the court's (or the reader's) imagination-it inevitably
comes into view, and, as Webster's reminds us, can seem massive and
impending, even when indistinct or distorted.
B. Lurking Authorities
Lurking authorities1 91 are also significant to judicial decisions, but they
occupy a different conceptual space. Unlike looming authorities, which
hover inescapably over courts as they are considering an issue, lurking
authorities "move ... inconspicuously"; they are "concealed but capable of
being discovered," even as they "persist in staying." 192 Lurking authorities
are those that legal writers do not feel compelled to address. That is, these
authorities can feel as if they have been discovered or marshaled for a
certain point rather than as if they were so omnipresent their introduction
into an analysis was inevitable.
188. In fact, it serves as a center of Justice Scalia's scathing critique of the Romer
opinion. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635, 640-42 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting).
189. See, e.g., Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and Political Analysis, 15
LAW & INEQ. 275, 279, 289 (1997).
190. And has been remarked upon by numerous commentators. See, e.g., William M.
Wilson Ill, Romer v. Evans: "Terminal Silliness," or Enlightened Jurisprudence?, 75 N.C. L.
REv. 1891, 1921-24 (1997).
191. 1 am indebted to Peggy Cooper Davis for this nomenclature.
192. WEBsTER's DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 710.
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Under this description, lurking authorities could be those that are
introduced to support a peripheral point, or could be central to the analysis.
The distinction between looming and lurking, then, is not necessarily one of
importance; it is one of palpability. While the weight of looming authorities
hangs over legal writers, lurking authorities feel to both writers and readers
more as if they were waiting around to be used, and their relevance is more
actively constructed by interpretive work. As such, lurking authorities are
not equally pressing for both sides of an argument, and may have little effect
on the opinion that does not deploy them. They might be technically binding
and on point for the side that uses them, but they do not bring with them the
level of cultural and perceptual power inherent to looming authorities.
The example of Brown is instructive here. The doll studies cited by the
Brown Court are classic lurking authorities. Unlike the precedent of Plessy,
they did not infuse the Court's consciousness. Rather, the studies existed
outside the legal environment, and the Court picked up on them (obviously
based on the arguments of the plaintiff and amici).193 This example is
useful, too, in showing that lurking authorities can trump looming authorities
in forming a court's opinion, as the doll studies did in providing an avenue
for repudiating Plessy. Moreover, it points to a functional difference
between legal and nonlegal authorities. While legal authorities-statutes and
cases-can either loom or lurk, nonlegal authorities-historical background,
social science research, political analysis-are almost always lurking.
The Brown Court's use of the doll studies suggests that scholars might
differentiate between the role an issue plays in the popular imagination and
the way in which it is received into the body of jurisprudence. That is, the
issue of the relationship between racial separation and white supremacy
might have loomed culturally before the 1954 Supreme Court, but was not
part of the legal vocabulary of the authorities that loomed over the Brown
Court. 194 The Court had to call upon lurking authorities to put the effect of
white supremacist segregation on the table to explicitly oppose it.
193. Moreover, had the Brown Court found for the Topeka Board of Education, it is
unlikely that the doll studies would even have made an appearance.
194. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In Sweatt, the Court, while using the
rubric of Plessy, acknowledged that the petitioner, as a black man, had no access to a law
school of equal quality to the University of Texas Law School, which had denied him
admission on the basis of race. Id. at 634. In its decision, the Sweatt Court detailed the clear
inferiority of the all-black law school without positing a cause and effect relationship between
the quality of education available to black law students in Texas and the practice of
segregation of educational institutions. Id. at 632-34. Moreover, it did not observe, as the
Brown Court did only four years later, that the reason for this disparity was the cultural and
legal institution of white supremacy. Id.; cf Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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The introduction of the doll studies in Brown, then, gave a clear
indication of what direction the Court was planning to take in its decision.
Here lies a crucial distinction between looming and lurking authorities. The
mention of a looming authority provides no information about a Court's
orientation: readers must pay attention to the interpretive work a court does
in using the authority, since the authority will show up no matter what the
court's decision. Since the introduction of a lurking authority feels so much
more optional than the invocation of looming authority, it can in itself
suggest the position a court will take, even before it analyzes the authority.
An obvious example of this in the Lawrence majority is the invocation of
religious and historical sources: the mere appearance of Leviticus,
Blackstone's, and Montesquieu's prohibitions on same-sex sexuality 195
sends a clear message of the court's intentions. Since these sources are
invariably (and only) cited, both in law and in the larger culture, by parties
desiring stricter regulation and suppression of gay sex and gay people, the
court's decision to pick up on them makes a political statement beyond the
applicability of the authorities themselves.
No wonder, then, that it is so startling to see the Lawrence majority cite
Kinsey's human sexuality studies to bolster its claim that sodomy laws do
not unfairly discriminate against gay people as a class, rather than seeing the
dissent use it to show homosexual orientation as a common and natural part
of human sexual structures. 196 If lurking authorities convey an ideological
message through their deployment, what does it mean when they are read
against the grain?
This question applies even more directly to the majority's use of Loving.
Loving is not a looming authority in the context of sodomy law, particularly
in cases that support the constitutionality of same-sex specific sodomy
statutes. The customary deployment of Loving in such cases is by advocates
and courts wishing to challenge the legitimacy of legal distinctions between
same- and opposite-sex sodomy laws. But Loving is in a liminal position:
pro-gay legal writers have been attempting to edge it up to the level of
looming authority, even as anti-gay proponents of sodomy law have both
taken it up for their own uses and kept it firmly in the category of lurking
authority. The ideological struggle here is clear. To position Loving as
looming in sodomy law consideration would, in this context, mean, both to
195. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (Tex. App. 2001).
196. See id. at 353 n.6.
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fix it interpretively 197 and to force supporters of discriminatory sodomy
laws to grapple with the case on a predetermined set of terms.
The stakes in this struggle are high for both sides. At issue is the
meaning of group classification: for Loving to be a looming authority would
mean that courts would have to accept that race and sexual orientation were
functionally analogous as social and legal classifications. More importantly,
Loving's cultural significance as the final nail in the coffin of legal
segregation could lend greater legitimacy to the struggle for lesbian and gay
civil rights in general.
But the stakes may be no less great within the narrower context of
strictly legal doctrinal interpretation. Just as pro-gay advocates have tried to
import Loving's analysis of equal protection into sodomy statutes, they have
also attempted to interpret Cleburne as a looming authority for any
interpretation of the rational basis test. The strength of Cleburne for
opponents of same-sex specific sodomy statutes is that it provides a close
and clear test of the obligations of even minimal scrutiny. Cleburne makes
an explicit distinction between minimal scrutiny and the constitutionality of
laws that trade on prejudice for their legitimacy. 198 Flying in the face of a
vast body of law that deals with non-suspect legal classifications, Cleburne
challenges the enormous latitude that minimal scrutiny often allows to
legislative action. 199 The power of Cleburne, then, is to provide guidelines
that prevent explicit discrimination without raising the specter of suspect
classification.
For Cleburne to qualify as a looming authority in same-sex sodomy
cases, courts would have to acknowledge that not only does longstanding
animus towards a group does not legitimate discriminatory treatment, and
that such dislike in fact renders discrimination suspect. The implications for
same-sex sodomy are obvious and far-reaching. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Lawrence majority is quick to relegate Cleburne to purely
procedural analysis: to examine whether a rational basis for different
treatment is achieved, to maintain that it is, and then quickly to move on.2° °
197. That does not mean to say that all looming authorities are fixed in the same way
in every context. Simply, it means that there is only one understanding of Loving that could
make it loom in a same-sex sodomy context: that discriminating between same- and opposite-
sex sodomy is analogous to discriminating between same- and cross-race marriage.
198. City of Cleburn v. Clebum Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,444-47 (1985).
199. See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact
of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591 (2000).
200. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 352.
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Lawrence, Cleburne, Loving, and even Kinsey demonstrate that
authorities do not necessarily fall into rigid, clear, or easily definable
categories, nor are they static over time. Although many, or even most,
authorities are evidently looming or lurking, there is an enormous amount of
tension at the margins, and for good reason. What advocacy in a social
context is about is transforming lurking authorities into looming ones (and
vice versa) in order to shift a social paradigm into a legal one. The very
ambiguity of classifying looming versus lurking authorities is due less to the
fragility of the categories than to the fierceness of the battles that these
taxonomies inform and by which they are structured. Equally important, it is
on the margins that the rhetorical power of looming and lurking authorities
becomes most distinct. The push-pull between factions reveals what exactly
is at stake in conceiving of an authority as looming: the demand that an
authority be dealt with in a certain way in a given context.
C. A Word About Methodological Authorities
Thus far I have dealt with the authorities that define the doctrinal
analysis of judicial decisions. But there are other ways that authorities can
be used outside doctrinal issues. One of these might be methodological-
authorities which are deployed so that courts can rehearse for themselves
what their judicial role is. Often courts use methodological authorities to do
more than define their role. These authorities are also called in to support a
court's definition of how its role should be implemented, for example the
way in which the Lawrence majority cites Cleburne as guidance in
interpreting the constitutionality of non-suspect legal classifications. 201
A clear example of this occurs in the Lawrence court's initial discussion
of the morality of same-sex specific sodomy laws. While the majority
acknowledges that the appellants deem the statute to be based on prejudice,
rather than moral insight,20 2 it maintains that its power to make value
judgments about the "moral justification for a legislative act is extremely
limited."'203 The authority cited on this point is, according to the court,
purely methodological: it indicates that it is not the job of the judiciary to
make laws, and since laws make moral decisions, it is not the role of the
court to second-guess the legislature. Citing several cases in which courts
determined that it was up to the "democratic process" to correct
201. Id.
202. Id. at 355.
203. Id.
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"improvident decisions" by the legislature,204 the Lawrence majority
asserted that "the people have granted the legislature the exclusive right to
determine issues of public morality." 205 By looking to methodological
authority to address the appellants' claim of prejudice, the majority can
wash its hands of the question-deciding the morality of laws is not its
job.206
The court's framing of an authority as methodological might have an
ancillary rhetorical purpose: the opinion can then imply that authority, and
hence the issues it might embody are not necessarily useful substantively.
This is the effect of the Lawrence majority's treatment of Cleburne. By
invoking Cleburne solely to describe a standard of analysis, and suggesting
through a direct citation 20 7 that this is the proposition for which the case
stands, 20 8 the majority defangs it as guidance into the meanings and
implications of historically based prejudice.
If the study of rhetoric teaches us anything, it is that even that which
appears to be solely a signpost can in fact be part of the road on which an
argument is traveling. Just as looming and lurking authorities can reveal a
court's ideological stance, recourse to the language of methodological
authority often defines the parameters of what a court believes an issue is
about (or wants to insist it is about). The Hardwick majority's implicit use of
Lochner, and its ultimate rejection, to define its authority in relation to the
rights entailed by the due process clause,209 and the limits on that authority,
is more than just an acknowledgment of the power of the Constitution and a
repudiation of "judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution." 210 Rather, it is the
Court's first step in its substantive decision to refuse to overturn Georgia's
sodomy law, and a not-so-subtle reinforcement of the Court's contention that
any other result would constitute bad jurisprudence.
The argument that only the legislature makes law, and that the judiciary
should distance itself from even the appearance of shaping law, is a major
element in the deployment of methodological authorities; and often serves to
204. E.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1999).
205. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 355.
206. Of course, this does not explain the court's later ease in affirming the morality of
same-sex sodomy laws.
207. That is, one unmodified by any weakening or explanatory signal.
208. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 352.
209. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). For a more complete reading
of the Court's implicit use of Lochner, see Thomas, supra note 85, at 1815-17.
210. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
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camouflage the judgments courts do make about the legitimacy of legislative
action. The Lawrence majority inserts such a use of authority into its
rationale for diverging from the decision of other states to legalize same-sex
sodomy. Aligning the actions of other states with "cultural trends and
political movements," 2 11 the majority quotes Justice Noggle of the Idaho
Supreme Court in his assertion that "[tihe court is not expected to make or
change the law, but to construe it, and determine the power of the law and
the power the legislature had to pass such a law; whether that power was
wisely or unwisely exercised, can be of no consequence." 2 12
By defining its defense of same-sex sodomy laws as part of the role of
the court, while condemning overturning such laws as judicial meddling, the
Texas Court of Appeals uses methodological authority to make a rhetorical
argument about the legitimacy of sodomy statutes more generally. The
Lawrence court's disregard of the long history of judicially constructed
common law is striking. Although the majority's invocation of the
legislature's power to craft law may be technically accurate, the opinion's
use of methodological authority to disassociate itself from the actual work
that courts do 213-and that, in its own opinion, it does-is a powerful
rhetorical move. In this way, a legal writer's introduction of some
methodological authorities may do more significant rhetorical work than the
use of either looming or lurking authorities, since so often part of the effect
of methodological citation is to obscure the connections between method
and substance.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE WORK AUTHORITIES DO
Certainly, this analysis of authorities only brushes the surface of the
possible investigation of a much-neglected area of legal writing. The
classifications laid out represent just one way of understanding what
authorities do. There are more categories than I have named, and more
subsections to each of the categories I identify. Nonetheless, classifying and
naming different uses of authorities makes an important point: that
authorities do fall into categories, even though legal writers are only rarely
conscious about their rhetorical choices of authority, and, even if conscious,
almost never explicit.
211. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 362.
212. Id. (quoting People v. Griffin, 1 Idaho 476, 479 (1873)).
213. And which commentators are willing to acknowledge openly. See, e.g., CARDOzo,
supra note 7, at 98-167; Patricia Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1394-1400 (1995).
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Conscious or not, legal writers invisibly construct interpretive
frameworks through their choices in introduction and positioning of
authorities. For example, acknowledging an authority's "loomingness," or
even just treating an authority as though it were looming is a decision that
has roots and consequences in rhetoric that both embraces and transcends a
specific piece of writing. Reproducing an authority as looming posits the
writer as not simply taking a side in a larger set of debates on an issue, but as
arguing who gets to speak about the issue, which voices will have power and
which will be consigned to the incidental or merely procedural.
But understanding that some authorities that legal writers use are
lurking, whether the writers acknowledge that or not, opens up a much
broader field of vision for analysis. By relying upon an authority that is
valuable but not obligatory, writers can expand the range of sources that
count as meaningful authorities, or attempt to knock an apparently looming
authority down into an optional resource (although not always successfully).
In fact, often the central struggles in litigation lie in advocates' efforts to
transform lurking authorities into those that loom, and vice versa. Finally,
the rhetorical power of representing an authority as methodological is clear:
the distinction creates a cordon sanitaire between a court and issues it might
see as too hot to handle. Transforming an authority from lurking to
methodological can shift the balance of an argument subtly but powerfully.
If we recognize what authorities do rhetorically, we can embark on a
serious interpretive project that reaches beyond the manifest arguments of a
legal text. Examining the explicit arguments of a legal text on the one hand,
and the implicit arguments of the authorities on the other, readers can
construct a parallax view of a legal decision that is complex and
multidimensional. Canny legal writers, once they recognize the power of
unspoken categories of authority, can consciously manipulate them,
constructing their own classifications, and challenging assumptions that
underlie and are undergirded by the seemingly effortless connection of, say,
same-sex sexual activity and late medieval legal tracts.
In many ways this article is itself a piece of advocacy for a different kind
of reading and a more conscious kind of writing. Legal writers are often
inclined to view the use of authority as at best, neutral, and at worst, a chore.
Usually citation is taught as a kind of punctuation to an argument, rather
than an element of it. Like punctuation, we tend to see the use of authority as
characterless within itself-as reflecting reality. Just as punctuation simply
shows us where we would pause and breathe if we were reading a text out
loud, indicates where ideas begin and end, legal writers imagine citation as
purely mimetic, tracing the path an idea has followed to reach the page.
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However, I would argue that the deployment of authority is more like a
syntax. That is, it creates meaning through a process of defining order. I
mean order here in two senses: on the one hand the arrangement of things
(the order of service), and on the other the hierarchy of that arrangement (put
your affairs in order, first things first). The classification of authorities is
syntactic and hierarchical. It tells the reader how important a piece of
information is, and where it belongs in relation to all the other pieces of
information. 2 14 Like syntax, in which word order both reflects and
constructs meaning, the use of authority supports and builds an argument,
prescribing a certain kind of analysis in relation to specific ways of thinking
about law.
When we truly understand the work that authorities do, we will have a
much clearer sense of how law is developed and shaped, and what legal
decisions mean in a holistic way. Assumptions underlying judicial decisions,
both conscious and unconscious, become clear in ways that would not have
been fully possible before. Most importantly, when readers and writers-as
advocates, scholars, and decision makers-critically examine the building
blocks of legal writing, we can understand more deeply the jurisprudence
that structures our work, our society and our lives.
214. This is even more true when one begins to look at the different signals that show
the relationship between the authorities and the propositions for which they are cited (see; see,
e.g.,; and so on), which construct a hierarchy of information within the categories of looming,
lurking and methodological authorities.
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